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training and skills for 32 years, and is the director of the Centre on  
Skills, Knowledge and Organisational Performance (SKOPE) at the 
University of Oxford. He has written extensively on the impact of 
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9FOREWORD
This	is	an	important	paper	which	FETL	is	delighted	to	publish,	in	
partnership	with	the	Association	of	Colleges	and	the	Centre	for	Skills,	
Knowledge	and	Organisational	Performance	(SKOPE)	at	Oxford	University.	
It	has	a	number	of	important	messages	about	the	complex	realities	with	
which	further	education	leaders	must	now	deal,	but	it	is	also	steeped	
in	a	sense	of	where	further	education	colleges	have	come	from	and	the	
pressures	and	policies	which	have	brought	us	to	our	present,	perhaps	
uniquely	challenging	state.
More	than	20	years	ago,	Helena	Kennedy	wrote	in	her	influential	report	
Learning Works	that	justice	and	equity	must	‘have	their	claim	upon	the	
arguments	for	educational	growth’	in	further	education	alongside	the	
demands	of	employers	and	the	needs	of	the	economy.	Her	report	warned	
that	increased	competition	in	the	further	education	sector	was	likely		
to	mean	colleges	pursuing	students	who	had	the	best	chance	of	success	
and	neglecting	those	whose	needs	were	greatest.
Two	decades	on,	Kennedy’s	warnings	look	prescient	indeed.	We	have	
entered	an	era	of	unprecedented	marketisation	in	the	further	education	
sector.	As	Professor	Keep	explains,	FE	colleges	and	independent	training	
providers	now	operate	in	a	set	of	‘inter-connected	markets’	though	they	
do	not	do	this	in	an	unfettered	way,	for	the	government	still	requires	
colleges	to	fulfil	part	of	their	social	purpose	mission	by	providing	
‘remedial’	education	and	acting	as	‘provider	of	last	resort’.	This	creates	
a	challenge	for	leaders	who	must	somehow	find	a	way	to	operate	
successfully	in	this	new	–	and	for	some	quite	alien	–	environment,		
while	remaining	true	to	their	values	and	striving	to	meet	the	needs		
of	their	community.	And	all	of	this	they	must	manage	in	an	incredibly	
tough	financial	environment,	buffered	by	profound	and	ongoing	policy	
turbulence	and	an	overbearing	accountability	regime	which	has		
proven	stubbornly	resistant	to	reform.
 
Dame Ruth Silver 
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Professor	Keep’s	paper	demonstrates	not	only	the	unprecedented		
nature	of	these	challenges	–	a	‘perfect	storm’,	he	says	–	but	also	the	
inadequate	base	of	knowledge	on	which	leaders	can	draw	in	responding	
to	them.	Change	in	the	sector	is	so	abrupt	and	so	constant	that	we	
struggle	to	develop	the	theoretical	understandings	we	need	to	make	
practical	sense	of	change.	There	is	a	serious	mismatch	between	the	
challenges	we	face	as	a	sector	and	the	skills	and	resources	available	to	
us,	particularly	in	leadership	terms.	This	paper	is	an	attempt	to	redress	
this.	It	asks	important	questions	about	how	leaders	can	deliver	against	
their	social	and	political	mandate,	and	fulfill	their	role	at	the	heart	of	
their	communities	as	fully	and	effectively	as	possible,	within	this	highly	
competitive	marketised	environment.
Further	education	has	always	had	a	strong	sense	of	social	purpose.		
It	is	part	of	the	origin	story	of	the	sector.	The	Kennedy	report	detected		
a	serious	erosion	of	this	tradition.	Two	decades	on,	it	is	clear	that		
while	many	providers	would	still	put	social	justice	high	on	their	list		
of	organizational	priorities,	the	economic	imperative	is	much	stronger	
than	the	ethical	or	social	imperative	in	the	work	of	further	education.	
As	Professor	Keep	acknowledges,	FE	is	not	helped	by	the	failure	of	
government	to	articulate	a	clear	vision	for	the	sector’s	future	or	to	be	
clear	or	consistent	in	its	own	thinking	about	markets,	their	purpose	and	
their	limitations.	The	future	shape	of	further	education	is	as	clear	as	the	
likely	outcome	of	the	Brexit	negotiations.
Professor	Keep’s	contribution	is	important	and	timely.	Whether	or	not	
you	accept	his	thesis	in	its	entirety,	there	is	no	doubting	the	scale	of	the	
challenges	further	education	faces,	and	the	need	for	fresh,	new	thinking		
in	enabling	our	leaders	to	rise	to	them.
Ruth Silver is President of the Further Education Trust for Leadership
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INTRODUCTION
Purposes of this paper
Largely	through	force	of	habit,	many	English	policymakers	and	
practitioners	still	refer	to	a	further	education	(FE)	‘system’,	yet	the	
reality	of	a	block	grant	funding	system	that	underpinned	this	model	
has	long	since	vanished	and	been	gradually	replaced	by	a	set	of	
inter-connected	markets	or	quasi-markets	for	different	streams	of	
FE	activity.	Marketisation	and	increased	levels	of	competition	and	
contestability	have	transformed	the	environment	in	which	colleges	
operate.	At	the	same	time,	developments	in	school	funding	and	
governance,	and	more	recently	in	higher	education	(HE),	have	resulted	
in	radical	changes	in	educational	provision.	These	changes	have	led	
to	greatly	increased	levels	of	competition	between	institutions	for	
students	and	funds,	and	the	arrival	of	new	regulatory	regimes	to	
oversee	this	competition.	
The	scale	of	this	shift	towards	markets	and	quasi-markets	raises	many	
issues	for	leaders	and	managers	in	FE.	For	example,	textbook	models	
of	markets	and	competition	suggest	that	there	are	hard	choices	to	be	
made	between	acting	as	an	effective	responder	to	market	incentives,	
and	meeting	wider	societal	and	political	goals	and	values.	Some	
aspects	of	economic	theory	suggest	that	rational	actors	will	segment	
their	markets	and	seek	to	avoid	lower	margin	business.	The	majority	
of	retail	banks	will	not	offer	accounts	to	low	income	customers	as	this	
is	not	profitable,	yet	FE	is	expected	to	deliver	a	considerable	volume	
of	remedial	education	and	to	act	as	a	‘provider	of	last	resort’	for	
many	students	that	other	education	providers	are	loath	to	cater	to.	
The	resolution	of	this	issue	will	be	determined	by	how	management	
and	leadership	teams	arrive	at	and	reconcile	the	trade-offs	between	
commercial	pressures	and	delivering	wider	social	outcomes.	The	
question	thus	becomes	how	institutions	conceive	of	these	trade-offs	
and	the	incentives	(financial	and	otherwise)	that	surround	them.	
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More	importantly,	in	an	increasingly	marketised	environment,	
institutional	survival	now	rests	on	management	and	governance	
teams	making	sense	of	their	roles	and	responsibilities	in	the	funding	
market(s)	within	which	they	are	operating.	Colleges	also	rely	on	
constructing	a	competitive	strategy	and	product	and	service	‘offer’	
that	provides	a	competitive	advantage	while	also	delivering	their	core	
mission	and	values.	Fashioning	and	delivering	this	strategy	is	arguably	
now	the	most	important	leadership	and	management	requirement	
in	most	FE	organisations.	The	Association	of	Colleges	(AoC)	and	the	
Centre	for	Skills,	Knowledge	and	Organisational	Performance	(SKOPE)	
at	Oxford	University	have,	with	funding	support	from	the	Further	
Education	Trust	for	Leadership	(FETL),	run	a	project	that	has	aimed	
to	explore	some	of	the	fundamental	issues	raised	by	increased	levels	
of	marketisation,	and	to	provide	a	set	of	scenarios	that	model	how	
the	marketplace	might	develop	by	the	year	2023.	The	project	did	
not	address	the	issue	of	whether	marketisation	is	desirable,	although	
several	of	the	respondents	we	interviewed	did	raise	this	issue.	
The	report	reflects	insights	gained	from	AoC-led	interviews	with	
a	range	of	AoC	staff	and	government	and	its	agencies	(including	
Ofsted,	Ofqual,	the	Education	and	Skills	Funding	Agency	[ESFA],	the	
Department	for	Education	[DfE],	and	the	Office	for	Students	[OfS],	as	
well	as	a	representative	of	a	post-92	university).	The	scenarios	were	
piloted	with	two	focus	groups	made	up	of	senior	staff	from	a	number	
of	AoC	member	colleges.	The	project	also	draws	on	what	little	research	
is	currently	available	on	marketisation	in	FE,	and	on	thinking	contained	
in	a	number	of	landmark	reports,	such	as	those	produced	by	the	Sharp	
Commission	(2011)	and	the	Foster	Review	on	Further	Education	
(Foster,	2005).	It	also	builds	on	elements	of	our	previous	project	for	
FETL	on	the	devolution	of	the	Adult	Education	Budget	(AEB)	(see		
Keep,	2016).
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Backdrop
Marketisation	is	not	the	only	change	that	is	impacting	on	colleges.	
In	fact,	FE	is	facing	yet	another	period	of	reform,	turbulence	and	
uncertainty.	The	complex	challenges	being	generated	by	these	changes	
overlay	a	set	of	structural	issues	that	colleges	face.	In	overall	terms	the	
main	issues	include:	
Students and the labour market
•	 	FE	often	acts	as	provider	of	last	resort,	dealing	with	the	
students	that	schools	and	universities	do	not	want	to	cater	
for,	and	it	spends	much	of	its	resources	trying	to	remediate	
prior	failure.
•	 	Low	employment	quality	in	the	labour	market	for	many	
of	the	jobs	that	college	students	will	enter,	which	in	turn	
has	knock-on	effects	on	FE’s	status,	and	on	the	student	
‘outcome’	measures	of	performance.
•	 	Impending	technological	and	occupational	change,	
increasing	self-employment	and	new	skill	demands	
(mostly	unknown	until	they	arrive)	that	are	disrupting	and	
undermining	existing	skills	markets	and	qualifications	–	for	
example,	the	impact	of	digitisation,	artificial	intelligence	(AI)	
and	industry	4.0	on	jobs	and	skill	requirements	(see	Brown,	
Lloyd,	and	Souto-Otero,	forthcoming).
•	 	Brexit	and	the	future	state	of	the	economy	and	labour	
market,	which,	alongside	demographic	change	and	migration	
policy,	will	impact	on	labour	supply	and	the	need	for	skills.
Funding and governance
•	 	Public	funding	has	been	declining,	and	inadequate	funding	
has	been	noted	as	a	problem	by	the	Chief	Inspector,	the	
FE	Commissioner	and	by	the	DfE	itself	(see	DfE,	2017).	
Research	in	colleges	suggests	that	declining	funding	has	
tended	to	overshadow	other	aspects	of	the	government’s	
FE	reform	programme	(BMG	Research	et	al,	2017).	The	
structures	and	systems	via	which	funding	is	provided	are	
also	both	extremely	unstable	and	complex.	Making	sense	
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of	them	and	assessing	the	risks	that	engagement	in	any	
particular	market	segment	may	pose	at	any	given	moment	
is	difficult.	These	risks	are	significant	as	witnessed	by	the	
outcomes	generated	by	the	tendering	process	for	the	AEB	
commissioning	undertaken	by	the	ESFA,	and	ESFA’s	non-
levy	apprenticeship	tendering	and	commissioning.	Both	are	
examples	of	processes	the	results	of	which	appear	to	have	
been	extremely	unpredictable,	even	for	organisations	with	
a	well-established	and	successful	track	record	as	providers	
in	these	fields.	The	rules	of	the	‘competition’	(which	is	to	
some	extent	administrative	rather	than	market-based)	are	
opaque,	and	outcomes	of	these	contests	are	uncertain	even	
for	large,	well-established	and	successful	providers	(e.g.	
Somerset’s	adult	learning	service).	The	fact	that	the	funding	
systems	for	different	streams	of	activity	are	also	constantly	
changing	and	evolving	means	that	past	performance	offers	
a	relatively	poor	guide	to	possible	future	performance,	
which	adds	to	the	levels	of	uncertainty	involved.
•	 	Marketisation	and	competitive	pressures	are	increasing,		
while	colleges	are	simultaneously	being	told	to	cooperate	
with	other	providers	in	their	area	–	for	example,	around		
social	mobility	(DfE,	2017a).
•	 	Governance	arrangements	are	not	necessarily	aligned		
with	current	realities.	A	policy	vacuum	also	exists	around		
this	issue.
•	 	Colleges	face	a	national	accountability	and	inspection	
regime	that	is	extremely	high	stakes,	which	is	accompanied	
by	pressures	generated	by	the	government’s	models	
of	key	performance	indicators	(KPIs)	and	the	design	of	
performance	management	systems,	such	as	the	impact		
of	‘Progress	8’	measures	on	FE	colleges	(see	Parrett,	2018).
•	 	Devolution	of	the	AEB	and	localism,	as	well	as	the		
multi-level	funding	it	brings	with	it	for	some	colleges,	are	
important	impending	elements	in	an	already	complex	
funding	landscape.	So	too	are	the	growing	potential	for	
tensions	between	localities’	desires	for	greater	policy	
influence	and	control	versus	the	DfE’s	‘place	blind’	model	
of	policy	and	the	ongoing	government	belief	in	a	highly	
centralised	national	direction	of	FE.
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Policy 
•	 	There	is	also	the	issue	of	policy	instability	and	the	
attendant	risk	of	disruption	to	established	markets	
and	streams	of	activity	–	for	example,	the	impending	
introduction	of	T	Levels,	the	National	Retraining	Scheme,	
work	placements,	the	transition	year,	devolution	of	the	AEB,	
and	apprenticeship	reform.	This	problem	is	compounded	
by	the	fact	that	many	of	the	consequences	that	develop	
as	a	result	of	policy	are	unintended.	The	general	direction	
that	policy	development	is	liable	to	take	on	some	aspects	
of	FE	are	by	no	means	easy	to	predict	by	those	outside	
the	‘sealed	unit’	that	is	central	government’s	policymaking	
system	and	process.
Taken	individually,	most	of	these	items	represent	formidable	
management	and	leadership	challenges.	Taken	together,	they	amount	
to	a	profoundly	difficult	environment	within	which	to	chart	a	course	
for	institutional	survival	and	growth.	
To	put	it	another	way,	if	marketisation	and	an	increase	in	contestability	
of	funding	had	been	taking	place	in	a	period	of	overall	stability,	and	
of	relatively	generous	levels	of	resourcing,	the	task	of	adjusting	to	this	
development	would	have	been	considerably	more	manageable	and	
less	risky	than	it	is.	The	current	environment	is	a	‘perfect	storm’,	and	
the	range	and	scale	of	the	risks	currently	confronting	the	management	
and	leadership	teams	of	FE	colleges	is	large.	This	means	that	senior	
management	and	governors	are	faced	with	a	high	level	of	complexity	
and	uncertainty,	particularly	in	institutions	that	cover	several	different	
streams	of	provision	(i.e.	are	not	specialist	institutions);	have	diversified	
across	different	types	of	provider	(independent	training	provider	[ITP],	
university	technical	college	[UTC],	or	academy);	or	across	different	
geographic	localities.	The	scenarios	will	explore	how	some	of	these	
challenges	might	play	out.	
The	other	background	factor,	which	will	be	touched	upon	in	this	
publication,	is	that	there	is	no	clear	overarching	government	vision	for	
FE	and	where	it	is	supposed	to	be	heading.	In	contrast,	within	HE	there	
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is	a	fairly	well-developed	model	and	set	of	expectations	concerning	
what	the	recent	reforms	are	expected	to	deliver,	although	how	this	
actually	plays	out	may	not	conform	all	that	closely	to	what	the	
government	expects	and	desires.	
For	FE,	the	most	developed	articulation	of	the	future	is	the	Skills	Plan	
(BIS/DfE,	2016),	but	this	relates	to	the	delivery	of	the	T	Level	reforms	
rather	than	any	wider	route	map	for	FE’s	development.	As	a	result,	the	
future	shape	of	the	college	sector	is	unclear,	as	is	the	relative	priority	
that	needs	to	be	afforded	between	FE’s	multiple	roles	as	a	provider	of	
16-19	and	adult	education;	as	a	provider	of	vocational	skills	(including	
higher-level	skills);	and	also	as	a	second-chance	route	for	both	young	
people	and	adults.
As	the	Foster	Review	noted	back	in	2005,	there	is	a	need	for	
government	to	fashion,	“a	coherent	and	managed	framework	spanning	
schools,	FE	and	HE…	so	that	FE’s	role	is	constructively	co-located	
alongside	HE	and	schools…”	(Foster,	2005:	viii).	In	the	continued	
absence	of	such	a	framework,	FE	has	problems	managing	its	borders	
with	schools	and	HE	and	is	in	danger	of	becoming	squeezed	between	
the	two	other	streams	of	provision	(see	below).
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MARKETISATION,  
QUASI-MARKETS AND 
CONTESTABILITY
Given	the	issues	and	caveats	raised	in	the	introduction,	the	section	that	
follows	seeks	to	set	out	the	essential	model	for	markets	in	FE,	to	explore	
some	of	the	features	that	make	it	distinctive	(relative	to	the	markets	for	
schooling	and	higher	education),	and	to	explore	some	of	the	limits	that	
have	been	imposed	on	it	by	a	range	of	circumstances	and	choices.
The model
It	is	important	not	to	see	the	dichotomy	between	markets	and		
systems	in	too	stark	a	set	of	terms.	Even	in	countries	where	a		
systems-based	approach	is	dominant,	such	as	Scotland,	institutions		
are	sometimes	competing	for	scarce	funding,	students	and	prestige.		
In	other	words,	inside	systems	there	is	often	an	element	of	
contestability	and	competition.	
Second,	as	Bailey	and	Unwin	(2014)	point	out,	English	FE	has	never	
been	a	fully-fledged	system,	and	colleges	have	always	needed	to	seek	
out	students	and	to	cater	for	transitory	demands,	often	from	students	
who	other	providers	were	not	keen	or	ill-equipped	to	cater	for.	The	
Foster	Review	stated:	“Over	time	the	FE	college	sector	has	responded	
to	the	ebbs	and	flows	of	need,	funding	and	policy,	acquiring	but	not	
necessarily	shedding	responsibilities	and	developing	a	multi-purpose	
culture	and	image”	(2005:	13).	Moreover,	as	Perry	and	Davies	(2015:	53)	
noted,	colleges	have	for	a	long	while	now	(certainly	since	incorporation)	
followed	the	money,	which	has	followed	individual	student	choice:	
“Colleges	are	only	paid	for	actual	enrolments,	and	these	reflect	student	
demand.	Any	institution	that	offered	courses	in	what	it	felt	students	
ought	to	do,	rather	than	what	they	wanted	to	do,	would	soon	go	out		
of	business”.	
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Third,	the	markets	that	have	been	created	in	English	educational	and	
skills	provision	are	not,	in	practice,	the	pure	or	perfect	market	of	the	
undergraduate	economics	textbook.	They	are	quasi,	bounded	or	qualified	
markets	(Tooley,	1992).	As	the	Department	for	Business,	Innovation	and	
Skills	(BIS)-commissioned	research	on	the	FE	marketplace	observed,	
“the	level	of	government	funding	and	the	role	of	government	and	public	
agencies	in	the	way	FE	is	delivered	mean	that	it	is	not	a	typical	‘market’”	
(Snelson	and	Deyes,	2016:	9).	In	designing	funding	and	governance	
models	there	exists	a	theoretical	spectrum	that	stretches	from	pure	
system	at	one	end	to	pure	market	at	the	other.	A	theme	of	what	follows	
is	that	England’s	practical	position	on	that	spectrum	has	shifted	in	
stages	towards	the	marketised	end,	albeit	with	limits	set	on	competition	
in	some	instances,	with	expectations	of	elements	of	inclusive	behaviour	
by	providers,	and	with	both	the	language	of	system	and	some	of	the	
design	features	of	systems	still	existing	alongside	a	set	of	quasi-markets	
for	different	types	and	levels	of	learning.	
It	is	also	argued	that	fundamental	tensions	exist	within	official		
thinking	between:
•	 Textbook	models	of	market	and	complex	reality
•	 	New	Public	Management	(NPM)	models	of	quasi-markets	
and	contestability,	where	competition	is	simply	one	tool	in	
a	managerial	approach	designed	to	obtain	greater	efficiency	
and	effectiveness;	and	economic	textbook	models	of	markets	
where	market	forces	and	effectively	functioning	markets	are	
the	prime	means	via	which	to	deliver	the	desired	policy	goals	
•	 Markets,	quasi-markets	and	various	forms	of	planning
Despite	these	caveats,	policy	on	schools	and	HE	gives	some	clear	
pointers	as	to	how	general	thinking,	hopes	and	intentions	around	
marketisation	in	English	education	are	being	framed:
We know that many systems improve because of the arrival of 
new challengers, introducing new ways of doing things.
(DfE,	2016a:	10)
New free schools and UTCs to enable parents and communities 
to demand more for their children. As well as taking action 
to transform underperforming schools, we will support the 
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establishment of new schools to drive up standards and stimulate 
competition… by stimulating competition to provide a new 
school we will ensure that the best possible provider can run it – 
whether they are existing local schools replicating themselves to 
spread their success, parent and community groups wanting to 
provide a particular kind of school in their local area, or successful 
teachers and leaders from elsewhere in the country spreading 
great practice to new areas.
(DfE,	2016a:	17)	
Similar	sentiments	surrounded	the	recent	reform	of	HE	funding,	
governance	and	accountability.	The	white	paper	on	HE	reform,		
Success as a Knowledge Economy	(BIS,	2016),	lays	out	the	reasoning	
and	aims	of	further	marketisation	in	HE:	
A new Office for Students will put competition and choice  
at the heart of sector regulation.
(2016:	6)
 By introducing more competition and informed choice into 
higher education, we will deliver better outcomes and value 
for students, employers and the taxpayers who underwrite 
the system… Competition between providers in any market 
incentivises them to raise their game, offering more innovative 
and higher quality products and services at lower cost. Higher 
education is no exception… There is no compelling reason for 
incumbents to be protected from high quality competition. 
We want a globally competitive market that supports diversity, 
where anyone who demonstrates they have the potential to offer 
excellent teaching and clears our high-quality bar can compete 
on a level playing field… New and innovative providers offering 
high quality higher education continue to face significant and 
disproportionate challenges to establishing themselves in the 
sector. Making it easier for these providers to enter and expand 
will help drive up teaching standards overall; enhance the life 
chances of students; drive economic growth; and be a catalyst 
for social mobility. They will allow us to improve the capacity and 
agility of the higher education sector, transforming its ability to 
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respond to economic demands and the rapidly changing graduate 
employment landscape, offering flexible provision to different 
types of students.
(2016:	8-9)
By	way	of	contrast,	relatively	little	has	been	said	about	official	
expectations	concerning	the	intended	impact	and	fruits	of	
marketisation	in	FE.	As	a	result,	it	is	not	entirely	clear	where	and	with	
what	degree	of	importance	marketisation	and	contestability	fits	into	
overall	policy	thinking	on	the	direction	of	travel	for	FE.	This	may	be	
because,	as	Lucas	and	Crowther	(2016)	argue	(echoing	Bailey	and	
Unwin,	2014),	FE	colleges	are,	“organisations	with	no	clear	national	
strategic	role”	(2016:	592).
The	main	documentary	evidence	on	the	government’s	thinking	about	
FE	marketisation	exists	in	the	form	of	two	pieces	of	government-
funded	research	rather	than	policy.	The	first	is	a	BIS	research	report	
(Snelson	and	Deyes,	2016)	on	Understanding the FE market in England,	
which	describes	the	multi-layered	FE	‘market’,	to	investigate	the	
degree	to	which	the	market	is	functioning	properly	as	judged	by	
economists’	somewhat	abstract	models,	identifies	barriers	to	the	
smooth	operation	of	market	forces,	and	suggests	policy	interventions	
to	improve	effectiveness.
The	second	is	a	DfE	research	report	(BMG	Research	et	al,	2017)	that	
attempts	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	what	its	authors	term	the	‘FE	
reform	programme’	(as	laid	out	in	the	government	documents	Skills 
for Sustainable Growth	[BIS,	2010];	New Challenges, New Chances	
[BIS,	2011];	and	Rigour and Responsiveness in Skills	[DfE/BIS,	2013]).	
This	programme	was	taken	to	include,	among	other	elements,	the	
introduction	of	the	National	Careers	Service	(NCS);	the	work	of	the	
Commission	on	Adult	Vocational	Teaching	and	Learning	(CAVTL,	
2013	and	2014);	the	Independent	Review	of	Professionalism	in	
the	Further	Education	and	Skills	Workforce;	Ofsted’s	Common	
Inspection	Framework;	the	introduction	of	funding	for	individual	
study	programmes;	a	‘simplified’	funding	system	and	the	introduction	
of	student	loans	for	post-19	Level	3	and	above	provision;	new	data	
management	systems;	and	greater	freedoms	for	colleges.	We	will	
return	to	some	of	the	report’s	findings	in	this	publication.	
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Marketisation is not new 
The	trends	that	power	current	policy	trajectories	do	not	come	out	of	
nowhere.	A	reliance	on	the	transformative	effects	of	quasi-markets	
and	contestability	was	encoded	in	the	ideological	DNA	of	NPM	
under	both	the	Conservative	governments	of	Thatcher	and	Major,	and	
under	New	Labour’s	Blair	and	Brown	administrations	(see	Hyndman	
and	Lapsey,	2016).	For	example,	Bryan	Sanderson,	first	Chair	of	
New	Labour’s	Learning	and	Skills	Council	(LSC),	suggested	that,	“if	
businesses	fail	to	meet	their	commercial	goals,	they	go	bankrupt	and	
can	help	nobody.	We	can	apply	the	same	thinking	to	further	education	
and	especially	the	way	it’s	funded…	to	be	brutal,	we	need	to	inject	a	
little	discomfort	into	this	scenario	–	fear	of	revenue	streams	drying	
up”	(Sanderson,	2001:	23).	As	Coffield	et	al	(2008),	Bailey	and	Unwin	
(2014)	and	various	contributors	to	Hodgson	(2015)	demonstrate,	
competition	between	colleges	for	students	and	funding	has	been	
going	on	for	a	long	time;	however,	in	recent	years	this	has	become	
more	intense,	more	overt	and	a	more	conscious	element	of	policy	
design	rather	than	the	unintended	outcome	of	other	changes.
Markets, management and the centralisation of power
Both	the	market	economics	textbook	model	and	NPM	favour	
contestability	as	the	most	effective	resource	allocation	mechanism	
and	as	a	driver	of	greater	efficiency,	lower	prices	and	customer-
responsiveness.	However,	NPM	also	incorporates	a	belief	that	political	
and	managerial	priorities	need	to	be	transmitted	and	reinforced	via	
audit	mechanisms,	KPIs,	targets	and	a	performance	management	
system	(PMS).	Here,	the	purely	economic	model	diverges	from	the	
NPM	model.	Economists	(of	a	certain	kind)	believe	that	the	invisible	
hand	of	the	market	and	rational	choice	will	deliver	the	maximum	
benefits.	NPM,	by	contrast,	implicitly	believes	that	government	and	
individual	ministers	ultimately	know	best	in	arriving	at	a	political	
judgement	of	what	is	required,	and	that	the	market	may	not	always	
deliver	what	is	deemed	best	by	those	best	placed	to	know	(government).	
In	NPM	thinking,	the	minister	is	in	effect	a	‘super	manager’.	
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As	a	result,	the	introduction	of	market	forces	in	and	of	itself	does	not	
always	mean	that	government	can	or	will	simply	step	back	and	leave	
the	construction	of	outcomes	to	reside	purely	with	the	aggregate	
consequences	of	atomised	customer	choice	decisions	and	providers’	
managerial	reactions	to	them.	As	the	trade	magazine	for	the	railway	
industry,	Modern Railways,	recently	observed:	“Perhaps	the	greatest	
unintended	consequence	of	privatisation	is	that	the	railway	today	is	
under	even	greater	state	control	than	at	any	time	since	the	days	of	
the	British	Transport	Commission	in	1948”	(Modern Railways	editorial,	
November	2017,	pages	6-7).	Policymakers’	desire	to	intervene	in	
public	service	delivery	is	high,	and	where	ministers	feel	that	outcomes	
will	reflect	on	them	rather	than	on	rail	companies	or	FE	colleges,	the	
logical	outcome	is	that	ministers	seek	to	intervene	in	how	provision	
is	arranged,	either	directly	or	via	the	relevant	regulator.	Powerful	
regulatory	bodies,	such	as	HE’s	OfS,	may	allow	government	to	deploy	
a	new	set	of	levers	through	which	to	transmit	ministerial	priorities,	
desires	and	whims.	This	intervention	in	the	operation	of	the	market	
can	usually	be	justified	by	resorting	to	the	notion	of	market	failure	
(Keep,	2006a	and	2006b;	Snelson	and	Deyes,	2016).	The	‘invisible	
hand’	of	the	market	and	ministerial	micro-management	often	goes	
hand	in	hand,	and	this	plainly	remains	a	danger	in	relation	to	FE.
The	history	of	educational	policy	since	the	early	1980s	demonstrates	
that	one	key	consequence	of	moves	to	markets	and	competition	has	
been	a	parallel	shift	towards	ever	greater	central	control	of	education	
by	national	government,	as	well	as	a	concomitant	decline	in	the	
influence	of	local	government	(Pring,	2012).	As	Pring	reminds	us,	
after	World	War	II,	in	most	local	authorities	the	largest	department	
with	the	most	sizeable	budget	would	have	been	education.	Since	the	
Thatcher	government’s	shift	to	marketisation,	coupled	with	radical	
centralisation	(Barber,	1994;	Keep,	2006a;	Pring,	2012),	the	role	of	local	
government	in	educational	provision	and	decision-making	has	shrunk	
to	a	marginal	one	that	revolves	around	child	protection	issues,	school	
choice	and	access,	and	educational	special	needs	provision.	Education,	
as	one	of	the	primary	levers	still	left	to	politicians	to	intervene	in	
economic	and	social	outcomes,	has	long	been	deemed	by	central	
government	as	far	too	important	to	be	left	to	others	to	play	with	
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(Keep,	2006a;	Keep	and	Mayhew,	2010	and	2014).	As	a	result,	the	new	
educational	marketplace	has	been	exclusively	designed	at	national	
level	with	no	serious	input	from	localities	or	other	stakeholders.	
Markets or systems (or both)?
In	our	interviews	it	was	apparent	that	many	policymakers	at	national	
level	implicitly	adopted	an	NPM	perspective	and	desired	to	achieve	
what	they	saw	as	the	‘best	of	both	worlds’	(i.e.	a	combination	of	
markets	and	system,	or	markets	and	governmental	‘steering’).	The	
belief	held	was	that,	with	a	sufficiently	sophisticated	set	of	incentives,	
they	would	be	able	to	create	markets	that	contained	elements	of	
cooperative	behaviour	where	policy	desired	this	outcome.	How	this	
balance	is	to	be	achieved	was,	however,	extremely	unclear,	and	as	
some	respondents	noted,	cooperation	and	collaboration	can	work	
but,	“it	boils	down	to	pounds,	shillings	and	pence	at	institutional	level	
when	the	backdrop	is	a	finite	market	for	provision”.	Self-interest	is	
liable	to	manifest	itself	when	competition	is	strong.	In	overall	terms	
there	was	no	consensus,	even	among	respondents	from	government	
and	its	agencies,	as	to	whether	this	blending	of	competition	and	
cooperation	was	an	achievable	goal.	Some	saw	it	as	achievable;		
others	expressed	strong	doubts	that	it	could	be	delivered.	
Given	the	above	discussion,	a	theme	running	through	much	of	what	
follows	is	that	there	are	two	fundamental	areas	of	ambivalence	
within	policy.	The	first	is	that,	as	noted	above,	there	is	a	deep-seated	
uncertainty	within	current	policy	stances	about	what	marketisation	in	
FE	really	means	and	how	far	it	should	be	allowed	to	develop,	and	this	
came	through	in	some	of	our	interviews	with	policymakers.	In	contrast	
to	schools	and	HE,	where	the	intended	impacts	of	market	forces	have	
been	fairly	clearly	specified,	FE	and	vocational	provision	seems	to	
occupy	an	uneasy	position	between	two	different	tendencies:	one	that	
favours	greater	contestability	and	the	attraction	of	new	entrants	into	
the	marketplace;	and	another	that	appears	to	want	greater	stability	in	
provision	and	elements	of	behaviour,	like	inter-institutional	cooperation,	
that	are	more	closely	associated	with	systems-based	approaches.	
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It	was	noticeable	that	in	interviews	for	this	project,	the	language	and	
perhaps	the	logic	of	the	economic	textbook	model	of	competitive	
markets	makes	some	policymakers	uncomfortable.	For	example,	one	
respondent	suggested	that	they	were	more	at	ease	with	the	label	
‘stakeholder’	rather	than	‘customer’	when	describing	students	who	
were	choosing	and	buying	learning.
The	second	area	of	ambivalence	is	reflected	in	the	tendency	for	
policymakers	to	want	to	avoid	the	downsides	of	any	given	choice:	they	
want	x	and	y,	not	x	instead	of	y.	This	plays	out	through	the	inclination	
of	FE	policymakers	to	be	nervous	of	the	textbook	model	of	market	
discipline,	whereby	providers	that	fail	to	deliver	what	customers	
(however	defined)	want	at	a	price	they	are	willing	to	pay	are	expected	
to	go	out	of	business	or	exit	the	market.	As	recent	experience	
demonstrates,	this	is	not	really	the	mechanism	that	government	
has	chosen	to	deploy	in	order	to	rationalise	the	scale	and	pattern	
of	provision	within	the	FE	sector	and	marketplace	at	local	level.	
Instead,	a	set	of	regional	government-sponsored	and	managed	official	
reviews,	the	Area	Based	Reviews	(ABRs),	was	seen	as	the	answer.	As	
the	decision	to	undertake	ABRs	demonstrated,	government	concluded	
that	market	forces-induced	attrition	was	liable	to	be	too	slow	and	too	
messy	a	process	to	be	allowed	to	shape	the	pattern	of	provision	and	
the	provider	landscape	where	funding	pressures	were	threatening	the	
occurrence	of	multiple	institutional	failures.	In	an	article	in	FE Week,	
the	Skills	Minister,	Anne	Milton	(2018),	talked	about	the	government’s	
desire	for	“stability	and	continuity”	and	“keeping	the	supply	of	training	
as	stable	as	possible”	as	outcomes	of	the	non-levy	apprenticeship	
tendering	process.	
Problems	with	the	sustainability	of	the	FE	sector	have	not	vanished	
with	the	ABRs	and,	as	FE Week	reported	(8	February	2018),	12	FE	
colleges	were	subsisting	on	ESFA	handouts	in	order	to	bolster	their	
finances.	This	reflects	the	fact	that	colleges	lack	the	ability	to	become	
legally	insolvent,	which	the	government	is	now	changing	through	
legislation.	Nevertheless,	the	FE	Commissioner	recently	suggested	that	
some	form	of	government	bailout	funding	for	colleges	that	get	into	
difficulties	is	liable	to	be	needed	for	the	foreseeable	future	(Burke,	
2018a).	Again,	the	current	policy	paradigm	endorses	and	invests	in	
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markets	and	market	forces,	but	seems	inclined	to	back	off	when	
unpalatable	consequences	seem	liable	to	emerge.	At	a	theoretical	
level,	policy	encompasses	a	desire	for	new	entrants	and	more	
contestability	(Snelson	and	Deyes,	2016);	however,	the	government	
and	its	agencies	seem	to	struggle	to	accept	the	idea	that	colleges	can/
should	exit	the	market	if	market	forces	render	them	insolvent.	Perhaps	
it	is	the	case	that	policymakers	are	comfortable	with	the	idea	at	an	
abstract	level,	but	find	it	painful	to	face	the	actual	consequences	of	
such	institutional	failures.	
Interestingly,	this	desire	for	stability	in	provision	appears	to	apply	
most	strongly	to	FE	colleges.	There	has	been	a	string	of	financial	
collapses	(sometimes	hastened	by	poor	Ofsted	inspection	outcomes)	
among	independent	providers,	and	in	the	majority	of	cases	this	
appears	to	have	been	seen	as	perfectly	acceptable	by	policymakers.	
The	one	exception	was	Learndirect,	the	largest	ITP	then	in	existence,	
which	the	ESFA	and/or	government	appear	to	have	deemed	too	big	
to	fail,	or	at	least	fail	rapidly	(see	Camden,	2018a).	It	is	also	plainly	
a	very	different	logic	from	that	operating	in	the	secondary	school	
sector	and	market	where,	although	formal	insolvency	of	the	kind	
that	will	now	be	possible	in	FE	is	not	accounted	for	in	legislation,	the	
reality	is	that	UTCs	and	studio	schools	have	been	failing	in	relatively	
significant	numbers	as	they	have	proved	unable	to	attract	sufficient	
pupils.	Some	Multi	Academy	Trusts	(MATs)	have	also	got	into	serious	
financial	difficulties,	been	wound	up	and	their	schools	transferred	to	
the	supervision	of	other	bodies	(McInerney,	2018).	The	government	has	
appeared	fairly	relaxed	about	these	failures,	despite	the	high	public	capital	
investment	costs	that	have	often	had	to	be	written	off	as	a	result.	
It	will	be	interesting	to	see	what	happens	when	the	first	HEIs	get	into	
financial	trouble,	an	event	that	appears	highly	likely	to	occur	given	
falling	applications	to	some	of	the	large,	lower	tariff	institutions	(see	
below).	The	rhetoric	of	the	new	marketised	HE	policy	is	clear:	failing	
universities	downsize	and/or	withdraw	from	that	area	of	provision	
and	exit	the	market.	As	Evans	notes:	“The	philosophy	of	market	forces	
that	inspired	[the]	Higher	Education	and	Research	Act	2017	(HERA)	as	
a	whole	predicts	and	welcomes	failures	as	evidence	of	the	successful	
operation	of	competition	in	the	HE	sector”	(2018:	5).	The	OfS’s	role	is,	
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at	most,	confined	to	trying	to	help	their	current	students	find	a	new	
provider.	The	traditional	route	for	HEIs	that	get	into	financial	trouble	–	
merger	–	will	be	much	more	difficult	to	contrive,	as	there	is	no	longer	
formal	provision	for	state	funding	to	incentivise	successful	institutions	
to	take	on	the	burden	and	risk	of	absorbing	a	weaker	institution.	
To	summarise,	policymakers’	reaction	or	attitude	towards	educational	
institutional	failure	as	a	result	of	the	action	of	market	forces	is	as	follows:
Schools		 ACCEPTABLE	CONSEQUENCE
Independent	training	providers	 ACCEPTABLE	CONSEQUENCE
Universities	 ACCEPTABLE		
	 (in	theory	only	at	this	stage)
FE	colleges	 	ABOUT	TO	BECOME	POSSIBLE		
(government	attitude	to	this		
actually	occurring	is	as	yet	unclear)
The	reasons	for	this	divergence	are	not	immediately	obvious,	but	
plainly	have	important	consequences	for	the	ways	in	which	different	
educational	market	segments	will	develop	and	need	to	be	regulated.
Another	sign	of	ambivalence	about	markets	in	FE	is	the	fact	that	it	
is	manifestly	unclear	whether	the	overall	pattern	of	course	provision	
should	best	be	determined	by	market	forces	and	atomised	student	
choice,	or	by	systems	designed	to	plan	and	match	skill	demand	and	
supply.	This	is	a	traditional	feature	of	the	NPM	model	within	English	
skills	policy	(Keep,	2002,	2006a	and	2016),	and	one	whose	latest	
manifestation	is	the	locality-focused	Skills	Advisory	Panels	(SAPs)	
promised	in	the	Conservative	Party’s	2017	manifesto.	Some	of	the	
policymakers	to	whom	we	spoke	argued	that	the	aim	was	to	get	to	
the	point	where	competitive	market	forces	mean	that	colleges	and	
ITPs	are	making	well-informed	decisions	on	course	mix	that	reflect	
employer	demand.	For	them,	a	poor	market	outcome	would	be	where	
all	the	colleges	in	a	locality	or	region	were	doing	the	same	thing.	The	
government	wants	across	the	board	course	provision	in	a	locality,	
but	to	do	this,	different	providers	need	to	cooperate	and	specialise	in	
different	things.	At	this	stage	it	is	not	clear	how	realistic	such	hopes	
are.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	ABRs	and	college	mergers,	the	pattern
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of	FE	provision	is	shifting,	and	indeed	has	shifted	substantially	in	the	
recent	past	(see	BMG	Research	et	al,	2017).	It	may	be	that	specialisation	
will	emerge	over	the	next	few	years.	
Competition in a market where someone  
else designs the product?
Besides	price,	the	other	normal	dimension	of	competition	is	product	
quality	or	specification.	The	means	to	competitive	success	in	the	
textbook	marketplace	is	to	design	and	then	deliver	a	distinctive	
product	or	service	that	rivals	cannot	imitate	or	match.	However,	in	
many	of	its	markets,	FE	finds	itself	delivering	and	selling	products	
that	have	been	designed	by	someone	else,	usually	with	little	or	no	
direct	input	from	colleges	themselves	–	for	example,	apprenticeship	
frameworks,	T	Levels	and	most	existing	vocational	qualifications.	
Awarding	bodies,	government	and	its	advisors,	a	small	subset	of	
employers	and,	in	the	future,	the	Institute	for	Apprenticeships	and	
Technical	Education	(IfATE),	will	have	normally	designed	the	product.	
In	marked	contrast	to	HE,	FE	and	secondary	schools	both	have	little	
direct	control	over	the	design	of	the	bulk	of	its	product	range,	or	over	
the	status	of	the	products’	brand	image	(which	is	generally	controlled	
by	government	and/or	awarding	bodies).	Moreover,	as	noted	above,	
one	of	the	disadvantages	that	FE	experiences	is	that	the	pay	and	social	
status	of	a	large	proportion	of	the	jobs	it	prepares	its	students	for	are	
relatively	low,	certainly	compared	with	what	people	perceive	will	be	
the	labour	market	outcomes	of	participation	in	HE.
Furthermore,	some	of	the	products	or	components	therein,	such	as	
the	need	to	deliver	English	and	maths	to	those	without	an	acceptable	
level	of	prior	attainment	in	these	subjects,	are	not	dictated	by	the	
market,	but	by	government.	It	seems	likely	that	if	it	were	left	to	
customers	(students),	English	and	maths,	at	least	in	the	form	of	
GCSE	resits,	would	vanish	in	an	instant	(BMG	Research	et	al,	2017).	
However,	customer	voice	is	often	not	heard	in	many	of	the	decisions	
about	product	and	service	design	and	specification	in	FE.	
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It	is	unclear	what	scope	there	is	for	differentiation	in	many	market	
segments	when	government	and	the	ESFA	dictate	the	price	of	the	
product,	and	where	the	curriculum	(unlike	in	HE)	is	set	by	external	
awarding	bodies.	How	does	one	college	differentiate	its	Level	2	
business	administration	course	from	that	being	offered	by	the	
college	down	the	road?	The	answer	would	appear	to	be	that	insofar	
as	most	general	FE	colleges	have	a	brand,	it	is	an	institutional	one.	
It	is	relatively	weakly	tied	to	the	delivery	of	a	distinctive	product	or	
service,	and	usually	seeks	to	differentiate	the	college	on	the	basis	of	
the	quality	of	provision	of	a	product	designed	and	specified	externally,	
links	to	local	stakeholders,	student	satisfaction,	etc.
As	a	result,	the	quasi-markets	that	English	policymakers	have	
constructed	in	FE	do	not	leave	much	in	the	way	of	conceptual	and	
political	space	for	bottom-up	leadership	or	strategic	change	and	
agenda	setting.	The	main	role	that	policy	allots	to	colleges	in	the	
multiple	marketplaces	of	FE	is	to	be	rapid	responders	to	customer	
preferences	rather	than	agenda	setters.	Customer	responsiveness	
rather	than	wider	strategic	agency	is	what	is	required.	
More	broadly,	one	of	the	problems	with	studying	FE	marketisation	
is	that	there	is	a	large	gap	between	the	simple	stylised	economics	
textbook	models	of	markets	and	competition,	which	suffuse	and	
inform	the	policy	discourse,	and	the	much	less	clear-cut,	far	more	
complex	set	of	rules	and	procedural	requirements	that	underpin	the	
acquisition	of	FE	funding	via	a	bidding	and	tendering	process	for	
different	ESFA	funding	streams.	Despite	the	official	rhetoric,	it	could	
be	argued	that	in	many	instances	the	real	customer	(i.e.	the	one	
with	the	actual	spending	power)	in	this	marketplace	is	neither	the	
student	nor	their	employer	(prospective	or	current),	it	is	the	ESFA	
and	the	government.	Moreover,	it	is	also	noticeable	that	outside	of	
apprenticeship	provision	and	other	forms	of	training	for	employers	
(and	HE	in	FE)	price-based	competition	plays	a	limited	or	non-existent	
role	in	competition	between	providers,	as	the	‘price’	is	established	by	
the	ESFA.
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Unpredictable and unintended consequences created by 
market incentives
Some	of	the	markets	that	FE	caters	to	are	extremely	volatile.	In	oral	
evidence	to	the	House	of	Lords	Select	Committee	on	Economic	Affairs,	
Richard	Atkins,	the	FE	Commissioner,	observed	that	the	margins	for	
colleges	on	the	different	streams	of	activity	and	funding	are	often	
very	tight,	that	outside	of	16-18	funding	volatility	is	sometimes	
considerable,	and	that	it	is	easy	for	a	college’s	finances	to	veer	off	
track	if	even	small	changes	occur	(House	of	Lords,	2018).	College	
management’s	perceptions	of	this	instability	and	its	impacts	on	their	
institutions,	not	least	in	terms	of	trying	to	spread	and	manage	risk,		
are	provided	by	BMG	Research	et	al	(2017).	
Moreover,	in	the	FE	and	vocational	education	marketplaces,	complex	
incentive	structures	exist	and	are	continuing	to	evolve.	Although	
these	incentives	exist	within	the	market,	their	origin	often	lies	not	
with	market	forces,	but	in	policy	decisions	and	the	particular	ways	
in	which	the	ESFA	has	designed	the	administrative	models	for	
funding	and	tendering	systems.	These	are	often	unstable	and	produce	
unexpected	results	and	unintended	consequences	for	policy,	as	players	
and	providers	act	in	response	to	these	incentives.	As	noted	above,	
knowing	in	advance	how	a	new	funding	round	will	operate	is	almost	
impossible	for	those	who	are	bidding.	Changes	in	funding	systems	also	
impose	significant	costs	on	colleges,	as	their	own	internal	systems	and	
processes	have	to	adapt	(BMG	Research	et	al,	2017).	
The	apprenticeship	levy	and	the	rise	of	degree	apprenticeships	is	one	
clear	example	of	this	in	operation.	The	levy	is	liable	to	reduce	provision	
for	16	to	18-year-olds,	particularly	in	entry-level	work	in	high-volume	
areas	such	as	social	care,	retail,	hospitality	and	catering,	as	employers	
refuse	to	live	with	the	day	a	week	on-the-job	training	requirement.	
The	losers	from	this	development	are	likely	to	be	FE	colleges	and	ITPs.	
This	is	also	likely	to	significantly	increase	the	proportion	of	degree	
and	above	apprenticeships	as	university	business	schools	and	other	
providers	(e.g.	Chartered	Management	Institute)	help	large	firms	
to	convert	their	graduate	training	schemes	and	management	and	
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supervisory	training	schemes	into	something	called	‘apprenticeships’	
in	order	to	reclaim	their	levy.	This	is	not	what	government	policy	
intended.	Additionality	via	the	levy	may	end	up	being	negative,	with	
the	overall	number	of	apprentices	smaller	than	it	was	before	the	levy	
(as	high-level	provision	is	more	costly	on	a	per	unit	basis).	In	addition,	
the	amount	of	training	that	otherwise	would	not	have	taken	place	will	
also	be	smaller	as	existing	management	training	is	simply	re-badged	
as	something	now	called	‘apprenticeship’.	The	levy	has	therefore	
provided	a	massive	incentive	for	firms	and	providers	(especially	
university	business	schools	with	spare	capacity	to	sell)	to	collude,	and	
for	universities	to	enter	into	the	apprenticeship	market	in	a	big	way.
There are multiple markets
There	is	no	single	‘FE	market’.	Within	English	FE	there	exists	a	range	of	
different	markets,	catering	to	different	ages	and	types	of	student	on	
different	course	levels.	The	shape	of	these	market	segments	and	the	
ways	in	which	they	function	is	driven	by	different	funding	streams	and	
arrangements.	The	situation	can	be	summarised	as:
•  16-19 provision:	driven	by	individual	student	demand	
and	with	funding	following	the	student	and	their	choice	of	
provider	and	course.
•  HE:	loans	funded	and	driven	by	individual	student	choice	within	
the	context	of	a	national	market.	Funding	follows	the	student.
•  19+ loans funded:	allocations	of	loan	funding	‘given’	by	
the	ESFA	to	individual	providers	to	be	‘sold’	to	students	with	
take-up	driven	by	individual	student	demand,	and	with	the	
long-term	impact	on	the	shape	and	size	of	demand	from	the	
switch	to	loans	not	yet	fully	apparent.
•  19+ Adult Skills Budget funded:	being	partially	devolved	
from	national	level	and,	from	2019,	to	be	commissioned	and	
effectively	planned	by	the	local	combined	authority	(see	
Keep,	2016).	For	non-devolved	areas,	providers	bid	to	the	
ESFA	for	allocations.
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•  Levy funded apprenticeship: purchasing	power	in	the	hands	
of	the	individual	employer.
•  Non-levy funded apprenticeship:	allocations	from	the		
ESFA,	which	then	have	to	be	‘sold’	to	individual	employers	
and	apprentices.
There	is	also	a	spatial	dimension	to	the	markets.	In	any	of	the	given	
segments	of	provision	to	which	FE	caters,	most	of	the	markets	are	
locally-based	rather	than	national	(unlike	the	HE	market).	As	a	result,	
a	set	of	overlapping	and	differently	sized	local	and	sometimes	regional	
and/or	national	markets	exist,	each	with	its	own	boundaries	and	
logic.	Research	for	BIS	(Snelson	and	Deyes,	2016)	suggests,	based	
on	a	detailed	analysis	of	travel-to-learn	patterns,	that	the	FE	market	
operates	at	three	distinct	levels	across	seven	groupings	of	provision:
Local 
1.	  Local core mixed environment training,	covering	Levels	0-3	
and	leisure	courses.	Within	this	market	there	are	distinct	customer	
segments	for	16	to	18	year-olds	(who	have	a	wider	range	of	
choice	of	providers	than	19+)	as	well	as	for	learners	routed	
via	Jobcentre	Plus	who	may	have	little	choice	of	providers.	
2.	  Local basic community-based training,	covering	Levels	0	
and	1,	as	well	as	adult	community	learning	courses	that	do	
not	lead	to	a	qualification.
Regional
3.	 	Capital intensive training,	offered	from	an	FE	provider’s	site	
(rather	than	in	the	workplace),	covering	all	qualification	levels.
4.	  Regional advanced sector-focused training,	covering	Level		
4+	but	only	on	courses	that	are	not	capital-intensive.
National markets
5.	  Sector focused training in the workplace,	covering	all	
levels,	with	distinct	customer	segments	for	large	employers.
6.	 Specialist (often residential) provision
7.	 Prison-based learning
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This	model	of	spatially	differentiated	or	segmented	provision	at	
different	skill	levels	implicitly	underpins	the	assumptions	upon	which	
the	case	for	National	Colleges	and	Institutes	of	Technology	(IoTs)	has	
been	founded.
There is a range of ‘customers’ and stakeholders, and the 
way their choices impact on providers varies
FE	is	very	different	from	schools	and	somewhat	different	from	HE	
in	respect	of	identifying	who	its	‘customers’	are.	In	the	school	sector	
and	marketplace	the	customer	is	the	individual	student	and	his	or	her	
parents	or	guardians.	They	are	the	consumers	of	what	the	school	has	
to	offer	and	their	choice	of	school	(mediated	by	its	popularity	and	
its	ability	to	actually	choose	at	least	some	of	its	students)	triggers	
funding,	as	funding	follows	pupil.	In	HE	the	primary	consumer	is	
deemed	to	be	the	student,	although	OfS	and	the	government	also	
talk	about	employers	as	customers	or	customer	interests	whose	needs	
should	be	taken	into	consideration	by	HEIs.	Again,	funding	follows	
individual	student	choice	of	subject,	course	and	institution,	which	
leaves	employers	with	limited	direct	leverage.	
In	FE	and	the	vocational	marketplace,	things	are	somewhat	different.	
For	16	to	18	and	19	year-olds,	funding	follows	the	student,	and	FE	and	
apprenticeship	and	traineeship	providers	are	in	direct	competition	for	
students	with	school	sixth	forms.	Money	flows	with	the	student	rather	
than	via	any	payment	by	an	employer,	so	students	are	the	direct	
‘customer’	whose	demands	need	to	be	satisfied.	The	same	happens,	
though	on	a	much	smaller	scale,	with	the	recruitment	of	students	
studying	for	HE	courses	within	FE,	where	the	funding	flows	through	
the	student.	
However,	in	all	the	other	market	segments	that	FE	operates	within,	this	
is	not	the	main	model	for	funding.	In	levy-funded	apprenticeship,	the	
customer	is	clearly	now	the	individual	employer	(or	an	agent	or	prime	
contractor	acting	on	their	behalf).	The	spending	power	is	in	their	hands.	
For	the	other	streams	of	activity,	colleges	and	a	wide	range	of	other	
types	of	provider	can	all	bid	for	tranches	of	public	funds	from	ESFA	–	
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for	example,	19+	loans,	19+	AEB,	and	non-levy	apprenticeship.	Once	
funds	(granted	against	forecast	student	numbers	and	enrolments)	
have	been	acquired,	the	provider	then	has	to	find	enough	students	
(or	in	the	case	of	non-levy	apprenticeship,	employers)	to	deliver	the	
places	and	volumes	promised	to	ESFA.	Undershooting	the	student	
volume	target	will	generally	result	in	money	having	to	be	handed	back	
to	ESFA.	The	direct	customer	is,	it	can	be	argued,	the	government,	and,	
once	the	AEB	has	been	devolved,	it	will	for	this	element	of	funding	
become	the	combined	authority	(CA)	within	whose	locality	the	
college	operates.	Not	all	respondents	accepted	this	model	of	analysis,	
with	some	insisting	that	the	state’s	role	is	not	that	of	a	customer,	but	
rather	one	of	an	enabler	and	or	regulator,	which	steps	in	when	the	
system	‘needs	help’.	
It	was	noticeable	that	some	government	and	agency	respondents	
we	interviewed	stressed	the	view	that	employers	were	increasingly	
being	seen	as	the	primary	customer,	particularly	in	relation	to	
apprenticeships	in	a	way	that	perhaps	had	not	previously	been	the	
case.	“Policy	is	shifting	towards	the	employer	as	the	overall	customer	
of	the	skills	system”	was	one	comment,	although	this	was	caveated	
by	the	observation	that	government	conceived	of	this	in	terms	
of	the	skills	that	employers	‘need’	rather	than	the	ones	that	they	
simply	‘want’,	as	it	was	recognised	that	employers	are,	“an	imperfect	
customer”.	In	a	well-functioning	market	there	would	be,	“a	smaller	gap	
between	what	employers	want	and	what	they	say	they	are	getting”.	
However,	this	does	not	mean	that	there	are	not	other	customers		
and/or	stakeholders	involved	in	the	FE	marketplace	(broadly	defined),	
not	least	students	as	a	collective	body	(rather	than	as	individual	
consumers)	and	the	wider	local	community.	This	raises	a	host	of	issues	
about	how	accountability	and	governance	arrangements	are	meant	
to	operate,	both	across	a	college	as	an	institution,	and	across	different	
strands	or	streams	of	provision	within	each	college.	There	is	plainly	
an	element	of	tension	between	the	clear,	stark	and	simple	economic	
textbook	model	of	individualised	customer-provider	relationships,	
and	the	much	more	varied	and	complex	relationships	in	FE	between	
the	college	and	those	who	choose	and	use,	directly	and	indirectly,	its	
products	and	services.
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Sub-contracting
Sub-contracting	elements	of	FE	provision	is	a	fairly	distinctive	feature	
of	the	FE	and	vocational	education	and	training	(E&T)	marketplace,	
in	that	it	does	not	really	occur	within	schooling	and	is	limited	within	
HE	to	where	a	university	validates	provision	by	others	(as	is	the	
case	with	most	FE	in	HE	courses).	It	is,	however,	a	major	part	of	the	
‘supply	chain’	within	some	strands	of	vocational	provision,	particularly	
apprenticeship	and	some	parts	of	adult	and	community	education,	
and	there	is,	for	example,	considerable	controversy	concerning	the	
tendency	of	the	lead	contractor	to	‘top-slice’	significant	sums	of	public	
funding	before	handing	it	on	to	the	sub-contractors	who	deliver	the	
provision.	It	also	means	that	the	quality	of	what	is	being	offered	is	
often	not	under	the	direct	control	of	the	‘prime’	provider.	This	is	a	
point	acknowledged	by	Ofsted	in	terms	of	their	recognition	of	the	
need	to	inspect	sub-contracted	apprenticeship	provision.	There	are	
interesting	questions,	which	this	project	has	not	had	the	time	and	
resources	to	address,	about	how	this	model	has	come	to	be	adopted	
and	what	its	full	implications	are.	
The vocational marketplace – welcome to the  
‘Wild West’?
One	of	the	more	striking	features	of	the	marketplace	for	some	forms	
of	vocational	provision,	particularly	apprenticeships	and	adult	post-
19	loans-funded	activity,	is	that	it	has	been	characterised	by	forms	
of	provider	and	supplier	behaviour,	particularly	among	some	ITPs,	
which	raises	serious	issues	about	organisational	ethics,	integrity	and	in	
some	instances	basic	compliance	with	the	law	(Camden,	2018a	and	
2018b;	Allen-Kinross,	2018).	The	very	gentlest	description	of	some	of	
this	behaviour	would	be	that	it	demonstrates	a	willingness	to	‘game’	
the	rules	of	the	public	funding	system	and	to	seek	to	circumvent	the	
original	intent	of	different	aspects	of	public	policy	–	for	example,	tax	
avoidance	linked	to	apprenticeship	levy	funding	(see	Allen-Kinross,	
2018).	In	other	cases,	outright	fraud	has	occurred,	for	example	
with	a	group	of	ex-professional	footballers	extracting	£5	million	
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apprenticeship	funding	for	‘ghost	learners’	and	provision	with	a	tiny	
number	of	contact	hours	per	student	per	week	(Camden,	2018b).
In	this	respect,	the	FE	marketplace	in	England	is	showing	some	signs	
of	mirroring	the	problems	with	fraud	and	low-quality	provision	
that	occurred	in	Australia	when	they	opened	up	their	technical	and	
further	education	(TAFE)	system	to	market-based	competition	by	
private	providers	(Ross,	2018;	Wheelahan,	2016	and	2018).	The	scale	
of	fraudulent	activity	in	some	of	the	Australian	states	has	been	vast	
(see	Ross,	2018),	and	serves	a	warning	about	what	can	happen	when	
market	regulation	fails	in	the	face	of	widespread	attempts	to	steal	
from	the	taxpayer.
interesting	questions,	which	this	project	has	not	had	the	time	and	
resources	to	address,	about	how	this	model	has	come	to	be	adopted	
and	what	its	full	implications	are.	
Policy ambitions
Policymakers’	aspirations	are	often	at	odds	with	the	reality	of	what	
either	local	systems	or	a	nationally-designed	marketplace	can	
realistically	be	expected	to	deliver.	The	decline	in	adult	learning	
volumes	at	Level	3	and	above	following	the	introduction	of	advanced	
learner	loans	in	FE	is	one	example	of	a	market-based	policy	not	
generating	the	intended	outcomes,	although	projections	by	BIS	did	
warn	that	loans	would	have	a	negative	short-term	impact	on	take-up.	
At	local	level,	the	ambitions	that	the	CAs	harbour	for	the	devolved	AEB	
often	appear	to	bear	little	relationship	to	the	actual	scale	of	resources	
being	offered	by	central	government.	For	example,	Greater	London	
Authority’s	(GLA)	core	AEB	will	amount	to	approximately	£311	million	
per	year,	to	cover	a	population	of	more	than	8.5	million.	The	ambitions	
contained	in	the	GLA’s	skills	strategy	(GLA,	2018)	are	extensive	and	in	
the	short	to	medium-term	are	probably	not	commensurable	with	the	
level	of	resources	available	to	deliver	them.
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Given	the	aforementioned	background,	how	well	and	in	what	ways	
is	the	current	FE	market	and	set	of	quasi-markets	functioning?	This	
section	outlines	some	of	the	key	points.
Massive variation in colleges’ starting points, capacities 
and responses to markets
Colleges	face	the	future	development	of	the	FE	marketplace(s)	from	
very	different	starting	points	in	terms	of:
•	 The	health	of	their	local	labour	markets	and	economies
•	 	The	degree	of	social	deprivation	that	the	communities	they	
serve	face
•	 The	types	and	mix	of	students	and	courses
•	 The	size	and	quality	of	their	buildings	and	equipment
•	 The	state	of	their	finances
•	 The	capacity	of	their	staff	and	management	structures
•	 Local	histories	and	patterns	of	competition	and	cooperation
•	 Relationships	with	a	range	of	local	stakeholders
For	example,	the	potential	for	cooperation	rather	than	competition	
in	16-19	provision	will	vary	enormously	depending	on	area	and	local	
circumstances	(e.g.	the	prevalence	of	school	sixth	forms).	This	has	
significant	implications	for	policy	development	and	for	the	rollout	of	
national	policy	initiatives,	in	that	the	ability	of	colleges	to	respond	to	
and	deliver	these	will	vary	considerably.
HOW THE FE MARKET IS 
WORKING – COMPLEX 
REALITIES
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It	is	also	the	case	that	developing	any	scenario	that	delivers	a	desirable	
outcome	for	all	colleges	is	extremely	hard	to	contrive.	It	is	clear	from	
the	focus	groups	and	from	our	previous	project	on	devolution	that	
different	institutions	want	different	things.	For	example,	some	colleges	
have	learned	to	compete	and	thrive	in	the	marketplace,	and	made	it	
clear	that	they	would	strongly	dislike	being	constrained	by	any	form	of	
new	local	accountabilities.	Others	would	like	to	see	more	cooperation	
between	local	institutions	and	might	be	willing	to	trade	some	
autonomy	for	greater	stability	in	funding.
New entrants and consolidation
The	FE	marketplace	has	welcomed	a	considerable	number	of	new	
entrants.	Snelson	and	Deyes	(2016)	note	that	between	2011/12	and	
2014/15	approximately	260	new	school	sixth	forms	entered	the	16-18	
market	(2016:	8).	Even	greater	change	has	taken	place	in	apprenticeship	
provision,	with	multiple	new	entrants	arriving	after	the	introduction	of	
the	levy.	The	number	of	approved	apprenticeship	providers	and	those	with	
an	AEB	allocation	registered	as	in	scope	for	Ofsted	inspections	rose	from	
1,043	in	2011/12	to	2,543	in	April	2018	(Burke,	2018b).	The	vast	bulk	of	
the	increase	has	taken	place	since	May	2017	and	has	raised	issues	about	
how	well-resourced	Ofsted	is	to	cope	with	this	set	of	new	providers,	
some	of	whom	the	chief	inspector	speculated	could	have,	“very	limited	
experience”	(Linford,	2018).	
This	influx	is	coupled	with	large-scale	ITP	failures	(e.g.	Learndirect),	and	
also	major	falls	and	shifts	in	the	pattern	of	employer	demand.	It	suggests	
that	in	some	of	the	markets	that	FE	operates	in,	competition	is	increasing,	
in	a	variety	of	ways.	
Some	of	the	respondents	we	interviewed	felt	that	there	was	a	tension	
between	market	exit	being	dependent	upon	Ofsted’s	grading	and	
judgement,	while	market	entry	sometimes	appeared	to	be	quite	low	
stakes	and	relatively	easy	to	achieve.	As	the	markets	develop	there	was	a	
belief	that	perhaps	ESFA,	IfA,	QAA,	Ofsted	and	OfS	would	need	to	think	
hard	about	the	criteria	for	accepting	new	market	entrants.
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The	other	way	in	which	the	marketplace	has	been	adjusting	is	via	
college	mergers.	No	less	than	55	college	mergers	have	been	completed	
or	are	due	to	be	undertaken	between	summer	2016	and	summer	2018.	
This	consolidation	has	been	driven	by	the	ABR	process,	but	also	given	
added	impetus	by	ongoing	funding	pressures.	
The role of competitors – schools and HE
One	of	the	central	issues	that	emerged	in	constructing	the	scenarios	
for	2023	is	the	fact	that	FE	is,	perhaps	more	than	ever	before,	in	
competition	with	schools	on	one	side	(BMG	Research	et	al,	2017)	and	
universities	on	the	other.	The	impact	of	the	competition	with	schools	
for	younger	learners	is	documented	by	BMG	Research	et	al	(2017).	
This	is	not	a	new	problem,	however.	The	Foster	Review	noted	that,	“the	
FE	colleges	are	more	and	more	drawn	and	squeezed	into	roles	that	are	
defined	by	demography	and	policy	changes	and	the	emerging	roles	of	
HE	and	schools”	(2005:	14).	The	issue	has	been	heightened,	however,	
by	funding	cuts	and	the	increased	pace	and	scale	of	the	marketisation	
of	schools	and	more	latterly	HE.	
With	the	current	demographic	downturn	in	the	number	of	older	
pupils,	secondary	education	in	England	is	facing	major	issues	about	
local	overcapacity,	a	situation	exacerbated	by	the	government’s	
pupil	choice	agenda	which	has	seen	investment	to	create	surplus	
school	places	as	a	means	of	enabling	competition.	Successful	schools	
have	to	be	able	to	expand,	and	new	challenger	entrants,	such	as	free	
schools	and	UTCs,	are	needed	to	enliven	the	market	and	disrupt	the	
dominance	of	established	players,	thereby	supposedly	stimulating	
a	drive	by	all	schools	to	improve	standards	and	better	provide	what	
parents	and	government	want.	As	a	result,	the	government	has	proved	
willing	to	fund	fresh	market	entrants,	provide	capital	investment	to	
get	new	schools	off	the	ground,	and	to	subsidise	their	losses	as	they	
seek	to	build	their	‘customer	base’.	For	example,	the	cost	to	the	public	
purse	of	establishing	university	technical	colleges	(UTCs)	has	so	far	
amounted	to	£192	million	(NAO,	2018).	Under-recruitment	against	
projected	targets	by	UTCs	meant	that	they	were	overpaid	by	the	ESFA	
to	the	tune	of	£11	million	in	2017	(Burke,	2018c).
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As	studio	schools	and	UTCs	have	discovered,	the	14-18	school	choice	
marketplace	that	has	been	created	is	a	brutal	one,	with	FE	colleges,	
apprenticeship	providers,	sixth	form	colleges	and	traditional	school	
sixth	forms	all	fighting	for	‘market	share’.	Within	this	marketplace,	
schools	remain	reluctant	to	allow	a	level	playing	field,	and	the	
government	has	recently	taken	action	to	enforce	the	‘Baker	Clause’,	
which	provides	a	legal	duty	on	schools	to	allow	other	education	and	
training	providers,	such	as	UTCs	and	FE	colleges,	access	to	pupils	to	
talk	to	them	about	technical	courses	and	apprenticeships	(Schools 
Week,	14	May	2018).
The	role,	weight	and	momentum	of	a	mass	HE	system	are	also	
extremely	important.	Schools	and	universities	have	tended	to		
possess	a	political	visibility	that	FE	lacks,	particularly	in	national	
policy,	and	HE	has	been	seen	by	politicians	from	all	parties	as	the	
prime	means	of	delivering	higher	levels	of	technical	and	vocational	
skill	and	enhanced	social	mobility.	More	importantly,	at	present,	
there	is	overcapacity	in	HE,	particularly	among	lower-tier	institutions,	
which	have	been	hit	by	the	tactics	of	elite	Russell	Group	universities	
which	have	been	expanding	their	student	numbers	quite	significantly,	
lowering	their	tariffs	and	recruiting	students	from	middle	ranking	
institutions.	Russell	Group	student	numbers	increased	by	15	per	
cent	between	2011	and	2015,	while	the	low-tariff	Million+	Group	
lost	22.9	per	cent.	Since	fees	were	increased,	universities	have	also	
invested	massively	in	capital	stock,	teaching	infrastructure,	new	halls	
of	residence	and	social	space	refurbishment	programmes	aimed	at	
attracting	students,	with	collective	overall	spending	in	the	region	of	
£28	billion	(Higher	Education	Funding	Council	for	England	[HEFCE],	
2018).	Much	of	this	has	been	borrowed	from	banks	at	commercial	
rates	of	interest.	As	HEFCE	notes,	financial	performance	in	many	
institutions	is	weakening	and	the	current	financial	trajectory	is		
not	sustainable	in	the	longer	term.	This	means	that	some	HEIs		
are	already	in	search	of	increased	student	‘feedstock’	and	new		
markets	and	customers	to	sustain	themselves.
At	a	broader	level,	the	government’s	current	inquiries	into	Level	4	and	
5	provision	and	post-18	funding	can	be	seen	as	straws	in	the	wind	in	
terms	of	the	dawning	of	a	new	questioning	of	the	sustainability	of	the	
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current	model	of	mass	HE.	Underlying	these	two	government	inquiries	
is	evidence	of	increasing	levels	of	non-repayment	or	partial	repayment	
of	student	loans,	and	of	a	large	number	of	graduates	working	in	non-
graduate	employment	on	low	rates	of	pay.	For	example,	25	per	cent	
of	all	UK	graduates,	10	years	after	graduating,	were	not	earning	more	
than	£20,000	per	annum,	when	the	threshold	for	starting	to	repay	the	
student	loan	is	£25,000	per	annum	(DfE,	2016b).	
If	the	current	model	is	found	to	be	unsustainable	then	HEIs	will	need	
to	respond	and	seek	to	reset	the	policy	agenda.	They	may	decide	that	
part	of	their	response	consists	of	delineating	the	‘space’	left	available	
to	FE	in	relation	to:
•	 Level	6	(honours	degree)	HE	in	FE
•	 Degree	apprenticeships
•	 Levels	4	and	5	sub-degree	provision
•	 Level	3	vocational	and	professional	provision
•	 Foundation	years
In	order	to	maintain	student	numbers	and	boost	income	levels,	some	
universities	are	already	looking	to	enter	and	develop	new	market	
segments	that	might,	in	other	circumstances,	be	seen	as	‘belonging’	to	
FE.	This	attracted	the	attention	of	several	of	our	respondents.	A	vice	
chancellor	in	a	post-92	institution	suggested	that,	“policy	is	always	
beaten	by	demographics”,	and	that	the	current	downturn	in	the	18	
year-old	population	means	that	HE	is	trying	to	find	new	markets	and	
students.	HNDs	and	HNCs	have	been	one	area	(see	Crowther,	2018:	
30-31)	and	another	has	been	access	courses,	which	are	traditionally	
a	preserve	of	FE.	Degree	apprenticeships	are	also	a	relatively	new	
focus,	and	it	is	reported	in	conversation	with	some	colleges	that	
their	local	university,	which	has	acted	as	the	validator	for	their	‘HE	
in	FE’	provision,	has	withheld	or	is	threatening	to	withhold	validation	
agreements	in	subject	areas	where	the	HEI	is	offering	or	liable	to	offer	
degree-level	apprenticeships.	A	few	universities	have	also	started	to	
move	down	the	qualification	levels	and	provide	mainstream	Level	
3	qualifications,	again	a	traditional	area	for	FE.	The	current	focus	on	
boosting	the	supply	of	Levels	4	and	5	provision,	and	the	need	for	more	
43
and	better	sub-degree	courses	(Wolf,	2017),	opens	up	the	prospect	
of	competition	between	HEIs	and	FE	colleges	as	to	who	will	lead	in	
developing	and	serving	this	new	stream	of	activity.	The	vice	chancellor	
that	we	interviewed	admitted	that,	although	they	had	hoped	to	work	
collaboratively	with	local	FE	colleges	on	this,	the	present	policy	and	
funding	environments	are	pushing	things	in	the	opposite	direction.	
Both	FE	and	HE	were	in	quasi-markets	that	made	close	cooperation	
hard	to	contrive.	In	Scotland,	under	a	‘paternalistic	system’,	it	was	
much	easier	to	construct	and	maintain	partnership-based	articulation	
agreements	between	colleges	and	universities.	
FE	therefore	finds	itself	potentially	squeezed	on	both	sides,	with	
competition	from	schools	for	16-19	students,	and	from	universities	
for	some	elements	of	post-19	provision.	Increased	competition	is	one	
response,	while	another	is	to	move	towards	more	cooperative	and	
integrated	local	tertiary	systems.
Regulating the marketplaces and ensuring accountability 
– complexity rules?
The	project’s	interviews	with	policymakers	and	stakeholders	revealed	a	
range	of	interpretations	of	how	the	current	inspection,	regulatory	and	
accountability	machinery	was	meant	to	operate,	and	widely	varying	
views	about	how	well	it	was	performing.	What	was	generally	accepted	
was	that	it	was	a	complex	picture.	In	marked	contrast	to	the	markets	
for	qualifications	and	HE,	there	is	no	single,	overarching	regulatory	
body	for	FE.	This	complexity	was	recently	acknowledged	by	the	Skills	
Minister,	who	admitted,	in	relation	to	accountability	for	quality	in	
apprenticeship	provision,	that,	“I	think	the	relationship	between	ESFA	
and	Ofsted	over	quality	is	quite	difficult	to	define	and	I	think	we	need	
to	define	that	more	clearly”	(Camden,	2018c).	This	confusion	exists	
despite	the	existence	of	an	apprenticeship	accountability	statement	
(DfE,	2017b),	which	is	supposed	to	set	out	exactly	which	body	is	
responsible	for	which	aspects	of	regulation	and	accountability	in	the	
new	and	emerging	apprenticeship	marketplace.	There	are	no	parallel	
documents	or	statements	for	the	other	FE	marketplaces.	
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In	the	overall	FE	and	vocational	marketplace	and	its	various	public	
funding	streams	there	is	what	could	be	termed	a	regulatory	and	
trading	oversight	regime,	which	had	grown	up	piecemeal	and	with	no	
overarching	design.	This	comprises	of	(NAO,	2017):
•	 	DfE,	which	‘sets	overall	policy	and	regulatory	framework	for	
further	education’	(NAO,	2017:	11)
•	 	ESFA,	which	monitors	both	the	performance	and	outputs	
of	providers	relative	to	a	set	of	minimum	performance	
benchmarks	and	targets	(e.g.	apprenticeship	completion	
rates),	and	also	the	financial	health	and	stability	of	providers	
(based	on	their	audited	accounts)	against	minimum	
standards.	The	ESFA	can	intervene	if	it	believes	there	are	
problems.	It	also	seeks	to	ensure	that	financial	regulations	
that	relate	to	the	spending	of	public	funds	are	adhered	to
•	 	Ofsted,	which	takes	an	overview	of	provider	performance	
and,	from	this,	profiles	provider	risk	and	directs	and	prioritises	
its	inspections	accordingly
•	 	FE	Commissioner,	who	can	intervene	in	FE	colleges	(but	not	
other	types	of	provider)	if	their	performance	is	seen	as	being	of	
concern,	and	can	develop	an	improvement	plan	for	that	college.
In	the	marketplace	for	providers	other	than	FE	colleges,	non-apprenticeship		
provision	that	is	employer-funded	is	not	regulated	in	any	way.	Providers		
not	in	receipt	of	government	funding	are	effectively	unregulated.	
Respondents	noted	that	there	are	sometimes	overlaps,	particularly	
where	funding	and	quality	oversight	meet,	that	each	market	segment	
has	its	own	‘system’	of	regulation,	and	that	the	new	model	for	HE	
(OfS	and	QAA)	is	very	different	from	that	pertaining	in	FE.	In	turn,	
compulsory	education	was	a	different	market	from	post-compulsory.	
The	transition	point	between	the	two	marks	a	different	market,	with	
different	metrics.	There	are	also	questions	about	the	level	at	which	
regulation	is	taking	place.	Chiefly,	this	is	the	individual	institution,	with	
the	wider	consequences	for	the	‘system’	and	pattern	of	provision	less	
visible.	In	overall	terms,	as	one	respondent	commented,	“at	present,	
regulation	is	a	hybrid,	with	a	lot	of	tensions	and	complexity”.	
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Besides	there	being	a	set	of	very	different	regulatory	systems	for	each	
segment	of	the	FE	market,	there	is	limited	transparency	regarding	
who	ultimately	decides	on	the	nature	and	rules	of	the	different	
competitions	for	public	funding.	Some	respondents	also	highlighted	
the	question	(raised	earlier	in	this	paper)	concerning	who	was	the	
primary	customer	on	whose	behalf	inspection	and	regulation	was	
taking	place?	There	were	potentially	several	different	answers:	the	
provider/institution,	employers,	students	(current	and	prospective),	
parents,	wider	society,	and	government	and	its	agencies.	At	present,	
there	is	just	one	inspection	report,	written	in	one	style,	to	meet	all	
these	different	needs.	Even	if	the	identity	of	the	primary	customer	was	
to	become	clearer,	it	is	also	far	from	obvious	which	element	of	the	
regulatory	system	really	guards	students’	interests.	Some	might	claim	
that	this	is	part	of	Ofsted’s	role,	but	it	is	not	manifestly	clear	that	this	
is	really	the	case	and	in	our	interviews	the	answer	to	the	question	of	
who	looked	after	the	interests	of	individual	students	was	noted	as	
being	quite	uncertain.	
Capacity	to	deliver	effective	oversight	is	also	an	issue.	Ofsted	has	
managed	to	extract	the	promise	of	additional	funding	to	support	its	
ability	to	inspect	the	multiple	new	entrants	to	the	apprenticeship	
market	noted	earlier,	but	other	agencies	have	been	less	fortunate,	
with	ongoing	staffing	reductions	in	the	civil	service	and	its	agencies	
creating	pressures	as	capacity	and	expertise	is	lost.	For	example,	the	
Learning	and	Skills	Council	in	2001	had	approximately	5,000	staff	
to	discharge	its	responsibilities.	The	ESFA,	which	has	a	larger	remit	
(covering	a	£50	billion	schools	budget	as	well	as	FE,	apprenticeship	
and	the	AEB),	has	just	1,100	staff.
In	addition,	market	regulation	and	institutional	inspection	are	two	
rather	different	activities,	with	different	rationales	and	outcomes,	
and	in	our	interviews	with	policymakers	some	concerns	were	raised	
about	the	high	stakes	and	consequences	that	resulted	from	Ofsted	
inspections	when	results	triggered	actions	and	interventions	by	ESFA	
and	others.	It	was	noted	by	some	respondents	that	this	had	a	negative	
impact	on	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	the	inspectorate	and	
the	sector.
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Another	downside	to	the	high-stakes	national	performance	
management	and	inspection	regime	is	that	it	may	act	as	a	
major	disincentive	to	innovation	and	experimentation	by	college	
management	and	leadership	teams,	as	the	consequences	attendant	
upon	any	visible	failure	are	liable	to	be	dire.	Rather	than	learning		
from	any	kind	of	failure,	the	system	we	have	at	present	is	much	more	
liable	to	punish	those	deemed	responsible.	There	is	an	interesting	irony	
here,	as	one	of	key	lessons	from	repeated	waves	of	national-level		
policy	failure	is	that	policymakers	are	almost	never	punished	for	
sponsoring,	designing	or	managing	what	is	often	abject,	large-scale	
and	costly	failure	(Guerin,	McCrae	and	Shepheard,	2018).	Nor	are	
lessons	necessarily	learned	through	this	experience	(Norris	and	Adam,	
2017).	Wild	and	risky	experimentation	instituted	at	national	level	has	
generally	carried	remarkably	few	consequences,	whereas	at	college	
level,	the	penalties	for	even	modest	forms	of	experimentation	that		
do	not	work	to	plan	are	extremely	high.
Local	accountability	also	matters,	and	in	the	CAs	this	issue	is	likely	
to	come	under	considerable	scrutiny	as	the	devolution	of	the	AEB	
and	its	consequences	unfolds.	On	this	topic	there	are	a	range	of	
models	already	available	that	could	form	the	basis	for	fresh	thinking,	
particularly	in	the	context	of	the	devolved	AEB	and	attempts	in	some	
localities	to	move	towards	more	local	partnerships	and	a	systems-
based	approach	to	provision	(see	Morecroft,	2012).	An	ecosystems	
approach	offers	one	avenue	(see	Hodgson	and	Spours,	2015;	Green	et	
al,	2017;	Green	and	Hogarth,	2016;	Buchanan,	Anderson	and	Power,	
2017;	Hodgson	et	al,	2017b;	Hodgson	and	Spours,	2018).	There	is	also	
the	City	Growth	Commission’s	(2014)	report	on	workforce	investment,	
which	provides	an	example	of	a	more	rounded	and	joined-up	
approach	to	what	a	localised	skills	system	could	look	like,	as	well	as	
how	it	might	interact	with	the	wider	labour	market,	employment,	and	
economic	development	and	business	improvement	policies.
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THOUGHTS BEFORE 
THE SCENARIOS
This	section	provides	an	overview	of	some	of	the	issues	that	
marketisation	by	central	government	is	raising	for	the	different	parties	
involved	in	English	FE.	There	are	many	topics	that,	for	reasons	of	space	
and	time,	have	had	to	be	left	to	one	side.
Overarching tensions
The	scenarios	reflect	on	the	fact	that	the	markets	that	FE	operates	in	
and	the	overall	policies	for	E&T	in	England	are	faced	with	four	major,	
overarching	issues:
1.	 	FE’s	role	in	dealing	with	social	inclusion	versus	a	role	as	a		
provider	of	high-status	vocational	courses	(see	Foster	Review,	
2005,	for	details).
2.	 	Market	or	quasi-market	versus	a	more	systems-based	approach	
(with	tensions	at	both	national	level,	and	between	national	and	
local	levels).
3.	 	National	versus	local	and	institutional	priorities	and	choices.
4.	 	A	long-standing	three-way	tension	between	the	pattern	of	
provision	that	employers	claim	they	want,	individual	students	
choose	and	government	aspires	to.
At	present,	none	of	these	tensions	has	been	resolved,	and	the	
immediate	prospects	for	this	occurring	are	limited.
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Where will devolution lead?
Devolution	of	the	AEB	forms	one	of	the	strands	within	the	scenarios.	
At	present,	it	is	limited	to	just	the	CAs	rather	than,	as	originally	
intended,	embracing	the	local	enterprise	partnerships	(LEPs),	and	it	can	
be	seen	in	two	ways.	The	first	is	that	this	represents	a	relatively	minor	
adjustment	that,	at	best,	will	create	some	small	geographical	‘islands’	
of	limited	systems-based	approaches	around	a	limited	funding	pot	
for	adult	skills,	which	are	surrounded	by	an	ocean	of	largely	market-
based	provision	and	national	policy	priorities.	The	AEB	will	not	provide	
a	high	enough	level	of	resources	to	incentivise	any	widespread	change	
and	local	collaboration	will	remain	patchy	and	weak.	The	second	
viewpoint	(see	Keep,	2018)	is	that	a	new	policy	model	is	emerging	
that	embraces	Wales,	Scotland	and	some	of	the	CAs.	This	emergent	
common	strategic	approach	integrates	skills	policy	into	a	broader	set	
of	policy	concerns	linked	to	localised	industrial	strategies,	economic	
development,	business	support	and	development,	innovation,	job	
quality,	fair	wages,	inclusive	economic	growth,	and	progression	in	the	
labour	market.
FE	is	well	positioned	to	contribute	to	this	more	integrated	policy	
model.	Colleges	know	how	to	offer	re-training	and	upskilling	
opportunities;	they	have	strong	links	to	local	communities	and	a	
track	record	of	engaging	with	individuals	and	groups	otherwise	lost	to	
education;	in	many	cases	they	possess	contacts	with	local	employers,	
especially	some	of	the	small	and	medium-sized	enterprises	(SMEs)	
that	other	networks	struggle	to	engage	with;	colleges	undertake,	
in	ways	invisible	to	Whitehall,	elements	of	business	and	innovation	
support	services	to	local	business;	college	delivery	models	are	usually	
more	flexible	than	those	of	schools	and	universities;	and	if	they	are	
quick	they	can	move	to	fill	the	significant	gap	in	sub-degree	(Levels	4	
and	5)	provision	that	national	policy	has	finally	woken	up	to.	
The	concept	of	FE	as	local	economic	and	enterprise	catalysts	and	hubs	
has	been	around	for	a	while	(Sharp	Commission,	2011).	The	new	policy	
focus	on	local	economic	development	and	socially	inclusive	growth	
offers	an	opportunity	for	FE	to	provide	local	leadership	and	to	meld	
together	its	two	main	roles:	second-chance	learning	and	vocational	
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skills.	In	some	localities	(the	West	Midlands	is	one	example),	college	
groups	have	already	come	together	to	explore	this	emerging	agenda	
through	new	kinds	of	FE	consortium	models	and	through	the	
promotion	of	new	joined-up	skills	offers	that	can	be	integrated	into	
economic	development	strategies	at	CA	level	(see	KennyBirch,	2018;	
West	Midlands	Further	Education	Skills	and	Productivity	Group,	2018).	
The	CAs	are	also	collaborating	to	share	information	and	learning	as	
policy	develops,	and	to	form	a	common	cause	to	press	Whitehall	for	
further	control	of	education,	training	and	skills.	How	devolution	unfolds	
and	where	it	stops	will	be	important	issues	in	the	coming	years.
The role of employers in provision
As	previously	noted,	for	some	in	government,	employers	have	come	to	
be	defined	as	the	primary	customer	in	the	emerging	FE	marketplace(s).	
As	such,	much	of	what	policy	desires	by	way	of	outcomes	revolve	
around	the	needs,	wants,	asks	and	actions	of	employers.	Employers’	
recruitment	preferences,	their	willingness	to	invest	in	adult	re-
training	and	upskilling,	and	their	propensity	to	take	on	apprentices	
are	central	to	government’s	policy	goals.	Current	indications	are	not	
particularly	encouraging	on	this	score.	On	recruitment,	many	of	the	
problems	of	informal	recruitment	processes	and	bias	against	young	
people	identified	by	the	UK	Commission	for	Employment	and	Skills	
(UKCES)	Youth	Inquiry	(2011)	appear	to	have	worsened	rather	than	
eased	(Purcell	et	al,	2017).	Innes	(2018)	notes	that	the	UK	now	has	
the	second	lowest	proportion	of	employees	receiving	work-related	
training,	with	UK	workers	only	half	as	likely	to	receive	training	from	
their	employer	as	their	counterparts	in	the	Netherlands,	Finland	and	
Sweden	(Innes,	2018:	9).
There	is	debate	over	whether	Brexit	will	push	a	greater	degree	of	
reliance	on	‘homegrown’	talent.	The	answer	is	probably,	but	the	scale,	
focus	and	practicality	of	this	shift	is	unknown	and	unknowable	at	this	
stage	in	the	Brexit	process,	and	it	is	unclear	how	willingly	employers	
will	cooperate	with	any	national	strategy	that	expects	a	greater	input	
and	expenditure	on	their	behalf.
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Given	this	backdrop,	one	of	the	key	issues	for	FE	policy	is	the	way	
in	which	in	England,	in	marked	contrast	to	Scotland	and	Wales,	
government	has	sought	to	remove	or	downplay	the	role	of	structured	
forms	of	representation	for	employers.	Instead,	there	is	a	reliance	on	
small,	one-off	groupings	of	employers	to	construct	apprenticeship	and	
T	Level	standards,	combined	with	employers’	choice	of	providers	as	
the	main	means	of	ensuring	that	FE	provision	is	responsive	to	labour-
market	demand.	The	paucity	of	effective	English	national,	sectoral	and	
local	and	regional	level	organisation	and	representation	for	employers	is	
now	quite	marked	when	contrasted	with	practice	elsewhere	in	the	UK.	
For	example,	in	Wales,	there	is	a	Welsh	Employment	and	Skills	Board	
(WESB)	and	a	Welsh	Apprenticeship	Advisory	Board	(WAAB).	Three	
Regional	Skills	Partnerships	(RSPs)	oversee	labour	market	and	skills	
forecasting,	and	provide	an	indication	of	priority	skill	needs,	and	the	
investment	of	time	and	energy	on	working	with	what	is	left	of	the	
Sector	Skills	Councils	(SSCs)	and	other	industry-level	representative	
bodies	to	maintain	and	update	the	National	Occupational	Standards	
(NOS)	that	underpin	the	construction	of	vocational	qualifications.	
In	Scotland	(see	Keep,	2017),	the	government	has	invested	in	the	
creation	of	regional	boards	to	deliver	the	Developing	Scotland’s	Young	
Workforce	policies,	which	has	required	priority	sectors	(i.e.	those	that	
are	the	focus	for	economic	development	planning)	to	develop	sectoral	
Skills	Investment	Plans	(SIPs)	has	also	worked	hard	to	ensure	that	
employers	and	their	representatives	are	as	fully	involved	as	possible		
in	policy	formation.	
In	Wales	and	Scotland,	notions	of	partnership	around	co-production	
of	skills	are	considerably	more	prominent	in	the	policy	discourse	
(Keep,	2014	and	2017).	Policy	in	Wales	is	shifting	towards	a	tertiary	
education	system	(bringing	together	FE	and	HE	under	a	single	funding	
and	regulatory	body)	within	the	wider	context	set	by	government	
economic	and	employability	strategies	that	seek	to	incentivise	
employers	to	play	a	more	active	role	in	skills	formation	and	to	assume	
greater	direct	responsibility	for	investing	in	their	employees’	skills.	
This	policy	is	backed	by	moves	to	make	employer	commitment	
to	improved	job	quality	and	investment	in	training	a	precondition	
for	being	able	to	access	Welsh	Government	industrial	support	for	
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training,	investment,	economic	development	and	business	support	and	
improvement	(see	Welsh	Government,	2018a	and	2018b).	
In	the	English	national	policy	context	things	are	very	different.	Even	
what	are	ostensibly	dirigiste	government	interventions,	such	as	the	
levy,	have	a	marketised	flipside.	The	levy	was	in	part	designed	to	‘put	
employers	in	the	driving	seat’	by	giving	them	a	greater	direct	financial	
interest	in	becoming	more	discerning	and	demanding	customers.	
However,	there	are	limits	to	this,	as	central	government	has	its	
own	aspirations	for	apprenticeships.	One	respondent	observed	that,	
while	the	rhetoric	around	“employers	in	the	driving	seat”	is	strong,	
if	employers	start	to	drive	too	fast	or	down	the	wrong	road,	the	
government	will	intervene.	
Against	this	national	policy	backdrop,	colleges	and	localities	(Keep,	
2016)	are	seeking	to	develop	their	own	approaches	to	working	
with	and	for	employers.	Colleges’	dealings	with	employers	can	be	
contractual	and	transactional,	but	this	does	not	have	to	be	the	
norm.	Hodgson	et	al	(2017a)	argue	that	colleges	and	employers	are	
not	bound	to	end	up	in	a	simple,	market-based	customer-supplier	
relationship,	and	that	longer	term,	more	trust-based	models	can	be	
developed,	especially	if	the	relationship	is	conceptualised	as	the	kind	
of	two-way	street	advocated	by	the	CAVTL	report	(CAVTL,	2013	and	
2014).	In	this	model,	co-design,	co-production	and	cooperation	within	
an	emergent	skill	ecosystem,	rather	than	a	spot	market	for	skills,	
becomes	the	aim.
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Successful performance = what exactly?
Working	out	what	good	performance	looks	like	is	not	easy	in	the	E&T	
marketplace.	In	part,	this	is	because	different	actors	and	stakeholders	
have	markedly	divergent	perceptions	of	what	kinds	of	outcomes	are	in	
their	best	interests.	Economic	theory	has	long	noted,	for	example:
•	 	Employers	logically	want	a	surfeit	of	skills	(in	order	to	give	
them	hiring	choice	and	drive	down	wages).	If	these	can	be	
provided	at	cost	to	the	state	and	the	student	rather	than	
themselves,	so	much	the	better.	If	they	have	to	train	at	their	
own	expense,	they	may	not	want	the	skills	to	be	certified		
or	transferable.
•	 	Individuals,	on	the	other	hand,	want	the	skills	they	are	given	
to	be	broad,	transferable	and	rewarded,	allowing	them	to	
exercise	choice	and	bargaining	power	in	the	labour	market.
In	light	of	this	tension,	provision,	curriculum	design	and	qualifications	
that	might	be	efficient	and	effective	for	learners	may	not	be	seen	as	
such	by	employers,	and	vice	versa	(Gleeson	and	Keep,	2004;	Keep,	
2012).	This	tension	suffuses	much	of	the	writing	about	the	purposes	
of	E&T,	and	the	principles	that	such	an	E&T	system	or	market	should	
be	founded	upon.	For	example,	the	Skills	Commission	(undated)	
recommends	a	learner-centric	approach	(‘what	is	right	for	each	and	
every	learner’)	to	design	and	delivery,	whereas	many	employers	want	
the	goal	of	providing	job	ready	workers	to	set	the	agenda	(Gleeson	
and	Keep,	2004;	Keep,	2012).	
As	a	result,	the	E&T	markets,	including	those	covered	by	FE,	are	a	
form	of	compromise,	often	shifting	in	balance	across	time	and	policy	
preferences,	between	what	would	best	suit	the	needs	of:
1.	 Individuals
2.	 Employers
3.	 Wider	society
4.	 Government	policy	and	aspiration
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One	of	the	key	policy	questions	is	the	degree	to	which	any	of	these	
stakeholders	is	willing	to	accept	what	are,	from	their	perspective,	
sub-optimal	outcomes	as	a	result	of	decisions	made	by	actors	in	the	
marketplace.	This	brings	us	back	to	the	issue	of	who	is	perceived	as	
the	(primary)	customer,	an	area	where	it	was	plain	from	our	interviews	
that	tensions	have	not	been	resolved.	There	is	a	“naïve	hope”	(as	
one	official	put	it)	that	everything	will	align,	with	individual	choices	
resulting	in	a	positive	equilibrium.	The	alignment	of	demand	and	
supply	was,	it	was	assumed,	just	going	to	happen	as	a	result	of	market	
forces,	within	what	was	sometimes	conceived	of	as	a	very	simple	
market	model.	
In	the	recent	past	in	England,	government	and	its	agencies	have	
proved	to	be	impatient	with	what	they	see	as	imperfect	choices	and	
investment	patterns	(e.g.	too	few	students	choosing	STEM	subjects,	
the	‘wrong	subject	mix’	at	various	levels	of	provision,	and	a	failure	to	
meet	employers’	needs,	however	defined).	Interestingly,	exactly	the	
same	problems	and	shortcomings	are	perceived	within	the	national	
E&T	systems	in	Scotland	and	Wales,	which	suggests	that	the	factors	
that	underlie	differing	conceptions	of	optimal	performance	are	not	
related	to	a	choice	between	a	markets-based	or	a	systems-based	
approach,	but	rather	are	a	reflection	of	fundamentally	divergent	
interests	among	the	various	stakeholders.	
What	this	suggests	is	that	those	in	charge	of	the	marketplace	
(government)	should	help	to	create	the	conditions	and	processes	
in	which	underpinning	shared	assumptions	about	what	effective	
operation	might	look	like	and	how	it	might	be	measured	can	be	
created	across	the	different	actors.	If	some	of	those	party	to	the	E&T	
market’s	operation	either	have	radically	different	views	about	what	it	
should	be	doing	and	whose	needs	it	should	be	meeting	and/or	prioritising,	
or	if	they	have	unrealistic	expectations	about	what	it	can	deliver	given	its	
funding	and	other	resources,	then	major	problems	will	ensue.	
Although	colleges	presently	operate	in	a	quite	complex,	high-stakes		
inspection,	regulation	and	accountability	regime,	there	is	no	
commonly-agreed	PMS	for	FE,	nor	a	commonly-agreed	definition	of	
what	are	the	appropriate	KPIs	that	would	denote	and	delineate	good	
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performance,	above	and	beyond	what	indicators	Ofsted	inspections	
rate	(see	Hadawi,	2018).	Some	of	those	we	interviewed	argued	that	
existing	performance	metrics	are	not	always	aligned	with	either	
market	needs	or	policy,	and	may	therefore	not	be	fit	for	purpose.	Also,	
the	scorecard	is	sometimes	marked	in	different	ways	for	different	
market	segments	and	providers.	
What	might	good	performance	in	this	new	and	emerging	marketplace	
look	like?	There	is	a	range	of	potential	indicators:
1.	 	Institutional	financial	health	and	profitability/surplus/	
reserve	generation
2.	 Learner	numbers	and	enrolments
3.	 Retention
4.	 Completion
5.	 Value	added	and	learning	gain
6.	 	Destinations	and	progression	(in	education	and	the		
labour	market),	labour	market	outcomes,	subsequent		
earnings	trajectories
7.	 Increased	financial	surplus	and	profit
8.	 	Local	or	national	market	share	for	given	types	and	levels		
of	course
9.	 	Feedback	and	repeat	custom	from	employers	they	undertake	
work	for
10.	 English	and	maths	resit	scores
11.	 Successful	inspection	outcomes
12.	 	The	scale	of	local	skills	shortages	and	the	degree	to	which	the	
college	and	local	employers	are	working	together	to	jointly	
address	these.
13.	 	Social	inclusion	outcomes	for	those	who	are	socially	
disadvantaged
14.	 Student	satisfaction	(measured	and	recorded)
15.	 Safeguarding	issues
16.	 Value	for	money	(measured	and	benchmarked)
17.	 	Innovation	and	quality	enhancement	of	both	process		
and	product
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There	are	three	problems.	First,	in	the	current	policy	set-up	it	is	
profoundly	unclear	who	could	or	should	define	good	performance	
(national	government,	ESFA,	Ofsted,	the	FE	Commissioner,	CAs,	
employers,	students,	or	colleges	themselves).	Second,	as	the	Centre	
for	Progressive	Policy	(2018)	noted,	the	data	to	support	useful	
performance	metrics	is	often	either	lacking	or	poorly	collated	and	
analysed.	Third,	as	things	stand	it	is	hard	to	see	who	would	act	to	
convene	the	different	interested	parties	and	to	facilitate	and	mediate	
discussions	about	what	good	performance	means.	At	present,	
government	is	content	to	allot	the	definition	of	performance	to		
itself	and	its	agencies.
The dominance of central government’s  
model of markets?
This	brings	us	to	the	highly	centralised	and	top-down	model	that	has	
survived	a	shift	from	system	to	markets	in	England.	The	tensions	that	
exist	within	policy	and	which	have	been	partially	explored	within	this	
paper	reflect	the	fact	that	policy	is	constructed,	exists	and	is	enacted	
at	a	number	of	different	levels,	each	of	which	creates	its	own	version	
of	‘reality’.	At	national	level,	inside	DfE,	there	is	little	pressure	to	
seek	to	reconcile	competing	policy	logics	of	markets,	quasi-markets	
and	elements	of	systems	thinking,	as	the	consequences	of	their	
inconsistency	are	not	made	material	at	this	level.	The	ambiguity	
that	exists	is	a	problem	that	has	to	be	solved	by	those	at	local	and	
institutional	levels.	There	is	also	the	fact	that	in	FE,	unlike	HE	and	
schools,	there	remain	sufficient	vestiges	of	a	systems	model	of	funding	
allocation.	The	institutional	memory	of	funding	agencies,	whose	
function	has	been	to	deliver	a	bureaucratic,	planning-based	approach,	
also	remains,	allowing	an	uneasy	mixture	of	markets	and	systems-
based	models	to	co-exist	across	different	funding	streams.	
	As	noted,	one	of	the	elements	implicit	in	much	of	the	national	policy	
discourse	around	FE	and	vocational	education	is	that	both	colleges	
and	ITPs	are	seen	as	agile	reactors	to	the	demands	and	designs	of	
others,	responsive	to,	but	not	part	of,	strategic	decision-making.	
In	other	words,	FE	is	seen	as	having	limited	need	for	independent	
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thinking	and	agency,	and	is	not	envisaged	as	having	a	major	role	in	
designing	change	and	higher-level	innovation.	It	is	not	‘scripting	the	
future’,	but	rather	reading	the	lines	written	for	it	by	others.	
As	ever,	government	has	allotted	this	prime	role	to	itself,	and	believes	
that	on	the	whole	its	priorities	can,	if	needs	be,	act	as	excellent	proxies	
for	employer	and	student	demand,	and	that	ministers	should	be	able	
to	retain	the	right	to	second	guess	the	market	when	it	suits	them	
to	do	so.	This	model	of	a	top-down,	one-way	policy	street,	where	
decisions	made	elsewhere	by	others	are	cascaded	through	education	
either	via	market	forces	and	student	choice,	or	by	ministerial	sanction	
or	a	mixture	thereof,	has	been	one	of	the	abiding	features	of	UK	
government	policymaking	in	the	E&T	field	for	the	last	35	years	or	
more	(Keep,	2006a,	2009	and	2012).	There	is	a	need	for	a	thorough	
debate	about	the	long-term	utility	of	this	model.
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THE SCENARIOS
Introduction
The	world	in	2023	is	very	hard	to	see.	What	follows	are	three	possible	
(partial)	models	of	what	could	occur.	They	are	not	meant	to	be	
detailed	forecasts	of	what	will	happen.	They	have	been	designed	to	
help	stimulate	reflection	on	different	visions	of	possible	futures	and	
to	aid	thinking	about	how	best	FE	might	respond	to	the	potential	
challenges	that	these	different	policy	trajectories	might	throw	up.
A	key	point	to	make	at	the	outset	is	that	developing	a	scenario	
that	delivers	a	desired	outcome	(however	these	might	be	defined)	
that	would	satisfy	all	colleges	is	impossible	to	contrive.	Different	
institutions	want	different	things.	
Some	colleges	may	want	to	develop	a	scenario	that	is	tailor-made	to	
their	locality	and	circumstances.
From now to there…
Earlier	in	the	paper	a	set	of	current	trends	were	set	out,	and	these	are	
what	potential	new	realities	will	be	built	upon.	In	addition,	there	are	
three	other	factors	that	will	or	may	impact	on	FE	in	the	years	leading	
up	to	2023:
Demography
Recent	years	have	seen	a	dip	in	the	English	16-18	population	
(approximately	15	per	cent	between	2015	and	2020),	but	thereafter	it	
starts	to	rise	again,	and	by	2030	should	be	20	per	cent	higher	than	in	
2020.	These	figures	assume	no	outflow	of	EU27	families	post-Brexit,	
no	change	in	the	balance	of	state	and	private	schooling,	and	no	
further	progress	on	raising	participation	age	(RPA)	rates.
Migration
The	impact	of	Brexit	on	the	volume	of	inflows	and	outflows	of	
population	is	as	yet	unknown	and	unknowable	until	such	time	as	a	
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clearer	policy	steer	is	available.	It	seems	probable	that	there	will	be	a	
somewhat	greater	focus	on	‘homegrown	talent’	to	fill	skill	needs,	but	
the	scale	and	nature	of	this	shift	is	hard	to	estimate.
Recession?
Economic	downturns	in	the	UK	and	across	the	developed	world	appear	
to	follow	a	cycle,	with	recessions	in	1961,	1973-75,	1980,	1991	and	
2008.	It	could	be	argued	that	by	2023	we	will	be	due	or	already	be	
experiencing	another	downturn	in	economic	activity.	Likely	outcomes	
include	rising	youth	unemployment,	a	tendency	for	more	people	to	
stay	in	education	as	they	seek	to	ride	out	a	tougher	labour	market,	the	
potential	for	a	counter-cyclical	boost	in	investment	in	skills	(which	did	
not	occur	in	the	2008	recession),	and	reductions	in	in-work	training.	
Scenario 1:  
Markets rule, tertiary institutions emerge in response
In	the	aftermath	of	the	Brexit	deal,	the	UK	embarks	upon	a	period	of	
transition,	as	economic	and	trade	policy	seeks	to	find	new	lode	stars,	
and	as	many	aspects	of	national	life	and	the	economy	and	labour	
market	adjust	to	new	circumstances,	challenges	and	priorities.	Against	
this	backdrop,	the	structural	aspects	of	E&T	policy	are	being	driven	by	
economic	rather	than	educational	theory.	An	ideological	belief	that	
markets	or	quasi-markets	are	the	best	mechanism	for	distributing	
scarce	public	resources	has	strengthened.	Competition	is	seen	as	the	
most	effective	means	of	driving	up	quality	in	provision,	and	inspection	
and	regulation	are	at	best	a	necessary	evil,	and	at	worst	sometimes	
a	barrier	to	true,	unfettered	competition.	There	has	been	a	rise	in	the	
use	of	rhetoric	stating	that	‘for	profit’	provision	in	education	would	be	
a	good	thing	and	that	it	could	motivate	improvement	and	drive	down	
cost.	This	viewpoint	was	neatly	encapsulated	by	the	Free	Enterprise	
Group	of	Conservative	MPs	(which	at	the	time	included	Liz	Truss,	Sajid	
Javid,	Mathew	Hancock,	Priti	Patel,	and	Andrea	Leadsom)	in	a	report	
published	in	2015,	titled	Towards 2025.	This	argued	that:
We live in a country where we allow people to make very good 
money for running a chain of restaurants or hotels, but not for 
running a chain of schools. We need to stop undervaluing those 
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who have the skills and expertise to ensure that our children are 
numerate, literate and ready for adult life… we need to allow the 
profit motive to ensure real lift off. 
(Kwarteng,	2015,	11)
The	government	states	that	its	overall	aim	is	to	foster	‘a	healthy	
marketplace’.	In	this	brave	new(ish)	world,	system	thinking	is	nostalgia!
The customer is…? 
In	pursuing	a	market	model,	government	has	arrived	at	a	relatively	
firm	position	that	the	customer	is	whoever	is	making	the	choice	of	
provider	and/or	who	is	paying	for	the	provision	(either	directly,	or	via	
the	levy).	The	mantra	is	that	the	‘customer	is	king’,	and	a	central	belief	
is	that	well-informed	individual	choice	(by	student	or	firm)	will,	at	
aggregate	level,	produce	the	optimal	skills	investment	outcomes.	
Planning	and	state	intervention,	viewed	as	‘second	guessing’,	are	out	
of	fashion	and	favour.	A	purer	form	of	marketisation	has	won	out	over	
NPM	models.	At	the	same	time,	there	is	a	strong	government	desire	
for	provision	to	deliver	to	employer	needs,	and	a	presumption	that	
doing	this	will	produce	major	economic	benefits,	not	least	in	terms	of	
productivity	improvements.	In	a	sense,	employers	are	viewed	as	the	
privileged	or	prime	customer,	and	the	aim	is	for	a	market	where,	“there	
is	a	smaller	gap	between	what	employers	say	they	want	and	what	
they	say	they	are	getting”.
Fiscal constraint 
Within	a	very	tight	overall	government	funding	settlement,	austerity	
lives	on	and	appears	liable	to	do	so	for	many	years	to	come	given	the	
state	of	the	public	finances	and	the	many	competing	calls	that	are	
being	made	upon	government	(health,	elderly	care,	housing,	defence,	
transport,	science	and	innovation,	to	name	but	a	few).	As	a	result,	
state	funding	for	education	and	training	is	tighter	than	ever,	and	the	
main	FE	market	segment	(16-18	and	19)	has	a	finite	number	of	
potential	students	within	it,	for	whom	FE	has	to	compete	with	
academies,	UTCs,	free	schools,	and	a	host	of	other	institutions.	A	
significant	number	of	T	Levels	are	being	offered	(particularly	in	
pathways	such	as	business)	by	MATs	and	UTCs.
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Apprenticeship sees new entrants to the market
Although	some	areas	of	the	mainstream	FE	market	for	vocational	
classroom	and	workshop-based	provision	have	seen	no	significant	
influx	of	new	entrants	or	challenger	institutions,	the	same	is	not	true	
in	the	apprenticeship,	where	a	substantial	number	of	university	
business	schools	and	other	university	departments	(e.g.	engineering)	
have	entered	the	field	to	offer	higher	level	(degree	and	above)	
‘apprenticeships’.	At	the	same	time,	there	have	been	new	private	
apprenticeship	provider	entrants,	although	very	few	are	mainstream	
businesses	trying	to	capitalise	on	their	own	training	capacity	
(Keohane,	2017).	This	is	for	the	simple	reason	that	most	firms,	even	
large	ones,	have	limited	internal	training	expertise	and	continue	to	rely	
on	external	providers	to	organise	and	deliver	their	apprenticeships.	
However,	various	new	players	in	the	apprenticeship	market	are	
abstracting	a	considerable	proportion	of	the	levy	funding.	The	16-18	
apprenticeship	market	has	shrunk	quite	considerably	and,	as	a	result,	
some	independent	providers	have	gone	under	or	retreated	into	
non-publicly	funded	work.
Adult loans-funded learning: scams and scandals
At	the	same	time,	competition	in	the	loans-funded	post-19		
Level	3	and	above	segment	has	also	intensified,	as	ITPs	have	taken	
opportunities	in	an	area	of	the	marketplace	that	is	less	visible	to	
public	policy	scrutiny	and	where	quality	control	is	harder	to	enforce.	
There	have	been	numerous	scandals	as	providers	have	scammed	
students	and	then	closed	down,	have	failed	to	deliver	on	their	
promises	of	quality	provision,	or	have	claimed	funding	for	‘ghost’	
students.	In	this	area,	English	experience	has	continued	to	mirror	what	
happened	in	Australia	when	their	TAFE	system	of	vocational	provision	
was	marketised	and	opened	up	to	private	sector	competition	
(Wheelahan,	2016).
Enter the dragon: the move to tertiary provision
The	biggest	change	in	the	level	of	competition,	however,	has	come	
from	the	HE	sector.	This	is	because	government	has	come	to	recognise	
that	mass	HE	based	on	resident	away-from-home,	three-year	full	
honours	degrees	is	expensive,	and	that	the	failure	of	many	students	to	
repay	their	loans	is	leaving	a	mounting	volume	of	debt	that	will	need	
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to	be	written	off.	There	has,	therefore,	been	a	policy	push	for	growth	in	
cheaper	sub-degree	provision.	The	overall	impact	has	been	a	downturn	
in	applications	for	full-time,	18-24,	three-year	degree	courses,	and	the	
gradual	shift	in	the	pattern	of	provision	has	accelerated	(growing	
student	numbers	in	Russell	Group	institutions	as	they	expand	their	
physical	‘footprint’	and	somewhat	lower	their	entry	tariffs	and	a	
marked	decline	in	applications	to	lower	tariff	HEIs,	such	as	the	
Million+	Group).	There	has	also	been	a	limited	number	of	new	
‘challenger	institutions’	that	have	entered	the	English	HE	market	from	
overseas	or	as	new	‘start-ups’,	although	far	fewer	than	the	government	
had	hoped.	A	significant	number	of	existing	HEIs	are	now	teetering	on	
the	brink	of	insolvency,	and	some	universities	have	found	themselves	
in	desperate	need	of	new	markets	and	customers.
As	a	result,	one	response	has	been	for	HE	to	move	downwards	into	
provision	normally	seen	as	the	preserve	of	FE,	following	the	logic	
of	vertical	integration	down	to	Level	3.	The	starting	pistol	for	this	
development	had	been	fired	by	institutions	such	as	Ravensbourne	(a	
design	and	digital	media	university	college	based	in	London)	but	was	
given	added	impetus	by	the	government’s	2018	inquiries	into	post-18	
funding	and	provision	at	sub-degree	level	(Levels	3,	4	and	5),	coupled	
with	the	concept	of	IoTs,	which	suggested	a	coming	together	of	HE	
and	FE	could	be	beneficial.	The	result	has	been	a	significant	expansion	
in	some	subject	areas	and	occupations	of	sub-degree	level	courses,	
accelerated	degrees,	and	the	further	development	of	unconditional	
offers	to	prospective	students	coupled	with	HEI-provided	access	
courses	and	foundation	years.
Some	HEIs,	particularly	low	tariff	institutions	that	are	the	dominant	
provider	in	their	locality	or	city,	have	gone	further,	merging	with	
the	local	FE	college	and	in	some	instances	vertically	integrating	
with	local	schools	by	taking	control	of	MATs	and	expanding	UTC	
provision	in	their	area.	They	are	now	consortia	institutions	that	span	
many	different	elements	of	the	market.	In	other	words,	we	have	
moved	from	a	world	where	there	is	FE	and	HE	to	a	model	that	sees	
tertiary	institutions	span	rather	blurry	lines	with	upper-secondary	
phase	provision.	There	are	several	logics	driving	this	development.	
The	institution	spreads	risk	because	it	has	access	to	a	wider	range	
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of	student	types,	market	segments	and	funding	streams.	By	running	
schools,	it	can	use	these	as	‘feeders’	into	its	post-18	and	19	provision	
at	degree	and	other	levels.	The	new	hybrid	institutions	can	operate:	
centralised	one-stop	work	placements;	careers	and	information,	advice	
and	guidance	(IAG);	and	business	liaison	services	with	the	associated	
economies	of	scale	and	increase	in	effectiveness.	These	new	arrangements	
also,	paradoxically,	reduce	local	competition,	and	there	are	towns	and	
cities	where	the	local	authority	has	encouraged	the	formation	of	this	
extended	model	of	provider	as	a	means	of	having	a	‘local’	champion		
that	brings	with	it	some	element	of	coherence	in	provision.
In	some	instances	the	operation	of	the	local	FE	college	has	been	
absorbed	into	the	new	tertiary	institution.	In	others,	the	expanded	
HEI	and	its	feeder	network	have	decided	to	act	as	rivals	to	the	local	
FE	college,	have	run	their	own	16-19	provision	(e.g.	T	Levels),	and	are	
aiming	to	squeeze	the	FE	college	into	a	narrow	niche	of	delivering	
what	could	be	termed	low	status	provision	for	residual	groups.	This	
provision	includes	English	for	speakers	of	other	languages	(ESOL),	
adult	literacy	and	numeracy	(ALN),	community	learning,	and	16-18	
students	on	the	‘transition	year’.	The	new	HEI	dominates	higher-level	
and	higher-status	vocational	course	provision.
A	smaller	number	of	FE	institutions	have	moved	in	the	opposite	
direction	and	obtained	degree-awarding	powers,	but	find	themselves	
competing	in	a	crowded	marketplace.	Colleges	have	an	edge	where	
they	are	offering	subjects	that	their	local	HEI	cannot,	or	where	there	is	
no	other	local	tertiary	provider.	At	the	same	time,	a	growing	number	
of	colleges	have	started	to	curtail	second	chance	and	social	inclusion	
provision	as	it	is	no	longer	deemed	financially	viable.	A	business	logic	
is	being	imposed	on	patterns	of	provision.	Third	sector	providers	and	
colleges	that	are	clinging	on	to	their	social	inclusion	role	are	being	
expected	to	fill	the	resultant	gaps.	The	old	model	of	the	general	FE	
(GFE)	college	is	in	decline.	Many	colleges	are	specialising	in	particular	
forms	or	levels	of	provision	where	they	believe	they	retain	a	local	
competitive	advantage,	and	college	chains	are	continuing	to	expand,	
as	scale	and	geographical	spread	is	seen	as	a	way	of	mitigating	risk	
and	securing	economy	of	scale	advantages.	
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The AEB: limited impact
The	impact	of	the	devolved	AEB	has	been	limited	in	most	places.		
The	sums	of	money	involved	are	relatively	small	and	much	of	it	is	
committed	to	nationally	determined	adult	entitlements.	As	noted	in	
our	previous	project	for	FETL	(Keep,	2016),	what	has	been	devolved	
from	central	government	to	localities	is	a	set	of	hard	and	potentially	
unpopular	decisions	about	what	to	spend	money	on	and,	more	
importantly,	what	will	not	get	public	support,	along	with	the		
‘blame’	and	political	problems	associated	with	it.
While	some	of	the	CAs	and	city	regions	(e.g.	London	and	Greater	
Manchester)	have	tried	to	use	the	AEB	as	the	starting	point	for	the	
creation	of	a	local	system,	progress	has	been	limited	as	the	provider	
base	in	these	large	areas	remains	relatively	fragmented	and	the	
government	has	resisted	calls	to	broaden	the	devolution	settlement	
to	include	any	aspect	of	schooling,	apprenticeship	or	HE.	The	
education	and	skills	elements	of	the	UK	Shared	Prosperity	Fund,	which	
the	government	introduced	to	replace	European	Social	Fund	(ESF)	
resources	post-Brexit,	are	being	tightly	overseen	by	DfE.	There	are		
even	murmurings	from	government	questioning	whether	devolution		
of	the	AEB	is	delivering	value	for	money	and	an	implicit	threat	that		
the	spending	might	need	to	be	re-centralised.
The big picture
The	overall	result	of	these	developments	is	that,	in	many	areas	of		
the	country,	FE	is	being	squeezed	extremely	hard.	In	others,	it	has	
either	been	marginalised	or	is	in	the	process	of	vanishing	entirely	as	a	
separate	institutional	form.	It	is	becoming	a	set	of	streams	of	students	
and	provision	that	are	incorporated	into	a	much	broader	school,	
tertiary	or	adult	provider	consortium	or	group.	Where	it	has	not	been	
absorbed	into	these	new	mega-providers,	FE	colleges	are	trying	to	
consolidate	through	a	further	round	of	mergers	and	strategic	alliances	
between	colleges,	and	also	sometimes	to	pursue	their	own	version	of	
vertical	integration	through	further	development	of	‘feeder’	schools,	
MATs,	UTCs,	and	the	purchase	of	private	providers.
Public	policy	has	reacted	in	different	ways	to	these	developments.	On	
the	one	hand,	government	can	see	the	commercial	logic	and	indeed	
imperative	of	consolidation,	and	institutional	reinvention	is	one	of	the	
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few	forms	of	bottom-up	innovation	that	it	wants	to	encourage.	The	
economics	textbook	sees	supply	as	needing	to	be	highly	reactive	to	
new	patterns	and	forms	of	demand,	and	what	is	occurring	conforms	
to	model.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	increasingly	uneasy	about	the	
emergence	of	what	in	some	instances	could	be	described	as	local	
monopolies	or	near	monopolies	in	segments	of	provision	in	some	
localities.	Indeed,	in	one	or	two	instances,	what	has	developed	could	
be	thought	of	as	an	integrated	local	‘system’	of	secondary	and	tertiary	
provision	under	the	umbrella	of	a	single	organisation.	
The	other	problem	for	government	is	that	the	new	hybrid	institutions	
are	a	regulatory	nightmare.	Who	inspects	and	regulates	which	
elements	of	the	new	extended	providers?	Does	any	single	agency	
(Ofsted,	the	FE	and	Schools	Commissioners,	the	OfS,	QAA,	ESFA,	the	
Institute	for	Apprenticeship	and	Technical	Education	[IfATE]),	have	
oversight	of	provision	and,	if	not,	how	can	the	different	agencies	be	
brigaded	to	work	in	an	integrated	fashion	to	oversee	the	marketplace?	
At	a	more	fundamental	level,	some	in	government	and	think	tanks		
are	asking	whether	the	post-18	and	19	market(s)	need	more	than		
the	lightest-touch	formal	regulation,	as	most	of	the	adult	provision		
is	loans	funded	and	decisions	are	taken	by	adults.
In	terms	of	institutional	governance,	the	new	market	models	raise	a	
number	of	questions.	At	what	level	is	governance	to	take	place	if	the	
organisation	is	now	in	effect	a	chain	or	grouping	(with	varying	degrees	
of	integrated	operation)	that	spans	what	used	to	be	several	separate	
institutions?	Some	of	the	expanded	former	HEIs	have	retained	a	single	
board	of	governors	for	their	entire	operations,	and	the	FE	component	
is	now	simply	a	department	or	sub-division	within	this	greater	whole,	
with	no	separate	governance	mechanism	of	its	own.	At	another	
level,	with	the	safety	net	of	secure	government	funding	having	been	
removed,	running	a	college	is	a	risky	business,	and	governors	have	major	
responsibilities	to	deal	with,	not	least	in	terms	of	trying	to	arrive	at	a	
suitable	and	sustainable	balance	between	income	(and	potentially	surplus)	
maximisation	and	the	meeting	of	wider	community	responsibilities.
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Scenario 2:  
A mixed economy, a messy marketplace  
and policy tensions
Two steps forward, one step back…
Against	a	backdrop	where	public	funding	remains	extremely	tight,	public	
policy	continues	along	traditional	tramlines	that	encompass	what	some	
commentators	have	described	as	a	‘double-shuffle’	(Hall,	2005;	Spours,	
2017).	Under	New	Labour,	the	double-shuffle	was	two	steps	forward	
with	systems,	central	control	and	planning,	and	one	step	back	with	
contestability	and	marketisation	(Hall,	2005).	Now	the	relationship	is	
reversed,	and	policymakers	at	national	level	hanker	after	the	paradox		
of	a	marketplace	that	has,	overlaying	it,	elements	of	systems-based	
behaviour,	particularly	coordination	and	cooperation,	in	relation	to	
particular	student/customer	groups	and	selected	policy	goals	(see	the	
DfE’s	Social Mobility Plan	from	2017	[DfE,	2017a]	as	an	example).
Overall,	they	want	the	best	of	both	worlds,	and	believe	that	with	
the	right	combination	of	accountability	systems,	funding	and	other	
incentives	they	can	achieve	a	balance	between	competitive	behaviour	
and	cooperation.	On	the	whole,	however,	when	the	chips	are	down,	
marketisation	remains	the	dominant	strand,	and	countervailing	priorities	
around	a	cooperative	approach	remain	the	subordinate	element.
Who is the customer and how do you match supply and demand?
Besides	wanting	marketplaces	that	contain	elements	of	cooperative	
behaviour,	policymakers	at	national	and,	in	some	instances,	local	level	
have	still	not	been	able	to	fully	confront	and	reconcile	who	the	
customer	is	within	the	various	E&T	market	segments,	and	how	far	
they	let	customers’	requirements	drive	policy.	As	a	result,	the	policy	
rhetoric	continues	to	stress	student	choice,	a	student-centred	model	
of	provision,	and	individual	returns	to	investment	in	skills.	This	is	
reinforced	by	outcomes-related	funding	which	means	that	FE	colleges	
are,	“a	business	where	each	learner	is	£4,000”	(Illsley	and	Waller,	2017:	
487),	where	learners	are	assets	and,	“students	can’t	fail:	all	students	
must	pass	or	we	have	done	all	the	work	for	nothing…	there	is	no	point	
if	we	don’t	get	any	money	for	them”	(Illsley	and	Waller,	2017:	485).
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However,	government	is	still	talking	about	employer	leadership,	the	
need	for	provision	to	match	and	meet	employer	needs	(however	
defined	and	articulated),	and	the	vital	importance	of	serving	the	
needs	of	the	economy	and	labour	market.	The	convenient	assumption	
is	that	atomised	individual	decisions	made	by	prospective	learners	
will,	largely	through	the	magic	of	the	market,	wage	signals,	improve	
information	flows	and	rational	self-interest,	and	deliver	a	pattern	of	
student	demand	for	learning	(in	terms	of	levels	and	types	of	course)	
that	match	what	employers	want.	Again,	the	double	shuffle	comes	
into	play,	and	policymakers	have	deployed	elements	of	indicative	
planning	for	provision	(as	exemplified	by	the	SAPs)	with	the	aim	of	
achieving	the	long-term	goal	of	‘matching’	skills	supply	with	employer	
demand	(whatever	that	might	mean	in	practice).	Indeed,	they	hold	
to	the	view	that	the	shared	objective	that	spans	both	market	and	
systems-based	approaches	to	E&T	is	the	need	to	achieve	better	
matching	(at	whatever	level)	between	supply	and	demand.
There	are	good	theoretical	and	practical	reasons,	as	well	as	a	long	
history	of	mismatches,	that	suggest	this	assumption	will,	in	many	
instances,	prove	to	be	misplaced	(see	Keep,	2002;	Keep,	2009;	Keep	
and	James,	2010;	Keep,	2012;	Davis,	2015)	and	that	there	are	often	
fundamental	tensions	between	what	individuals	and	employers	want.	
Given	how	the	public	policy	discourse	around	skills	has	traditionally	
been	constructed,	policymakers	at	both	national	and	local	levels	
continue	to	struggle	to	square	the	eternal	triangle	of:
•	 	Employer	skill	‘need’,	which	is	often	short-term	and	incredibly	
firm	specific	(see	Green	et	al,	2017a,	on	how	this	plays	out	in	
the	West	Midlands)
•	 	Individual	student	demand	for	courses,	some	of	it	unrelated	
to	their	current	employer’s	needs	(e.g.	career	change)
•	 Course	supply	(provision)
As	one	college	principal	put	it,	“colleges	are	the	mediating	point	
between	the	needs	of	employers	and	the	needs	of	the	wider	
community	and	individuals”,	and	this	is	not	always	a	comfortable	
place	to	be.
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The	result	is	that	colleges	and	other	providers	continue	to	be	chided	for	
failing	to	deliver	what	is	wanted,	and	there	is	ongoing	angst	about	the	
volume	and	quality	of	STEM	provision,	skill	‘shortages’,	and	employers’	
pleas	for	more	and	better	skills	supply	to	meet	their	needs.	Moreover,	
when	push	comes	to	shove,	central	government	is	clear	that,	in	
some	instances,	power	and	control	of	how	policy	plays	out	is	far	too	
important	to	simply	be	handed	over	to	customers	and	market	forces.
Institutional failure: repercussions
Due	to	funding	pressures	and	significant	falls	in	post-19	participation	
and	undergraduate	applications	to	lower	tariff	HEIs,	a	number	of	
colleges	and	HEIs	have	become	insolvent	and	closed	down.	In	FE	the	
insolvency	regime	introduced	in	2018	has	worked,	in	the	sense	that	it	
has	allowed	for	a	relatively	orderly	winding	down	of	a	college’s	affairs,	
but	the	political	fallout	from	college	and	university	closures	has	been	
significant	and	has	taken	ministers	by	surprise.	In	many	instances,	the	
college	or	university	had	been	the	largest	employer	in	the	town	or	
small	city	(sometimes	alongside	the	local	hospital)	and	the	loss	of	this	
anchor	institution’s	staff	wage	and	student	spending	power	has	
wrought	havoc	on	the	local	economy.	In	a	number	of	cases,	these	
college	closures	have	happened	in	rural	or	semi-rural	areas,	where	
weak	local	transport	links	mean	that	there	is	no	alternative	provider		
to	whom	students	can	transfer.	Consequently,	a	significant	hole	has	
opened	up	in	the	pattern	of	provision	available	to	young	people	and	
adults.	So	far,	new	entrants	have	not	been	racing	to	fill	these	voids.
These	developments	do	not	sit	comfortably	alongside	the	
government’s	place-based	narrative	regarding	areas	of	the	country	
that	have	been	left	behind	and	the	need	to	spatially	re-balance	the	
economy	in	the	interests	of	social	justice.	Furthermore,	the	MPs	in	
whose	constituencies	this	has	occurred	have	been	aghast,	and	with	
several	more	colleges	and	HEIs	now	close	to	bankruptcy,	the	pressure	
is	on	government	to	find	ways	to	avoid	further	closures.	On	the	other	
hand,	as	officials	and	special	advisors	remind	ministers,	this	is	exactly	
what	was	supposed	and	indeed	intended	to	happen	as	a	result	of	
marketisation,	with	ineffective	providers	encouraged	to	withdraw		
from	the	market.
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Tensions between national and local levels emerge
A	number	of	flashpoints	have	emerged	in	the	relationship	between	
national	government	and	its	agencies,	and	localities:
1.	 	Between	national	focus	and	stress	on	markets	and	
contestability	and	the	CAs’	enthusiasm	for	developing	stable,	
integrated	systems	of	provision	that	rely	on	cooperation	
rather	than	competition.	Other	localities	want	the	freedom	
and	power	to	follow	this	example.
2.	 	Between	localities’	desire	to	expand	their	control	beyond	the	
AEB,	and	national	government’s	ongoing	refusal	to	countenance	
further	devolution	of	funding	or	policymaking	powers.
3.	 	Between	national	policy	models	that	continue	to	
conceptualise	and	operate	via	individual	policy	silos	(skills,	
science,	innovation,	economic	development)	and	an	emphasis	
on	traditional	skills	supply	models	and	some	CAs’	attempts	
to	join	the	dots	and	develop	more	integrated	policy	offerings	
that	achieve	inclusive	economic	growth	and	see	the	role	of	
skills	in	a	much	broader	context	(supply,	demand	and	use).
In	terms	of	point	1,	while	some	CAs	have	gone	down	a	simple	
commercial	tendering	route	in	order	to	allocate	their	AEB	monies,	
most	have	opted	to	try	(at	least	on	paper)	to	create	some	kind	
of	local	system.	They	seek	to	use	the	AEB	funding	as	a	catalyst	to	
develop	increased	cooperation	between	providers	and	more	capacity	
for	planning	provision,	particularly	as	potential	calls	on	the	AEB	
significantly	exceed	its	scale.	They	have	also	introduced	stakeholder	
boards	to	coordinate	action	and	to	allow	non-market-based	forms	
of	influence	on	provision.	For	all	the	non-devolved	areas	of	funding,	
national	government	still	wants	to	deliver	contestability	and	a	
marketplace.	Moreover,	in	most	CAs,	AEB	spending	priorities	that	were	
inherited	with	this	pot	of	money	have	continued.	As	a	result,	Greater	
London’s	AEB	has	largely	been	allocated	towards	priorities	around	
English	and	maths,	ESOL,	digital	basic	skills,	adult	and	community	
learning,	disadvantaged	learners,	and	SEND.	It	is	therefore	focused	
primarily	on	core	employability	skills,	rather	than	higher-level	tech	skills.	
In	other	words,	these	priorities	have	very	little	to	do	with	the	glossy	
government	agenda	of	skills	at	Levels	4	and	5,	IoTs	and	technician	skills,	
or	with	local	industrial	strategies	focused	on,	for	example,	advanced	
69
manufacturing,	life	sciences	and	automotive.	In	addition,	it	is	not	
necessarily	the	agenda	that	many	employers	would	prioritise.	AEB	is	
mainly	supporting	lower	end,	disadvantaged	groups	of	learners.	There	
is	a	limited	‘match’	to	the	government’s	Industrial	Strategy.	Given	that	
potential	calls	on	the	AEB	vastly	outweigh	the	resources	available	to	
deliver	them,	there	is	a	need	to	motivate	stakeholders	to	leverage	other	
funding.	This	is	proving	extremely	hard	to	engineer.
With	regard	to	point	2,	as	set	out	in	Keep	(2016),	from	the	outset	of	
the	devolution	debate	in	England,	city	regions,	CAs,	counties,	the	Local	
Government	Association,	LEPs	and	various	think	tanks	all	indicated	
a	desire	and	argued	the	case	for	localities	to	acquire	funding	and	
policy	powers	that	extended	beyond	the	limited	offer	from	central	
government	of	control	of	the	AEB	to	the	CAs.	These	aspirations	have	
grown,	and	the	larger	CAs,	such	as	Greater	Manchester	and	Greater	
London	(see	GLA,	2018)	have	become	increasingly	frustrated	at	
central	government’s	continued	refusal	to	allow	them	any	direct	
influence	over:	
•	 	schools	policy	and	an	ability	to	intervene	in	failing	schools	
14-19	policy	and	the	post-16	budget
•	 traineeships
•	 	apprenticeship	policy	and	funding,	and	advanced	learner	loans
•	 	elements	of	the	Department	for	Work	and	Pensions’	budget	
for	skills	and	training
As	a	counterbalance	to	central	government,	CAs	are	liaising	with	one	
another,	and	attempts	to	learn	and	share	knowledge	have	grown	into	
an	alliance,	pushing	for	further	devolution	of	money	and	power.	This	
standoff	means	that	the	vast	bulk	of	policy	direction	is	still	set	at	
national	level.
In	terms	of	point	3,	which	is	an	area	of	national	and	local	policy	
dissonance,	a	major	opportunity	has	arisen	for	colleges	in	those	
localities	where	the	CA	has	been	able	to	develop	thinking	around	
a	more	sophisticated	package	of	policies	in	relation	to	industrial	
strategy	and	inclusive	growth.	Under	the	government’s	Industrial	
Strategy	established	in	2017,	CAs	were	charged	with	developing	their	
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own	localised	version	of	a	national	approach.	These	developments	
coincided	with	a	major	push,	led	by	the	Joseph	Rowntree	Foundation	
and	others,	around	the	need	to	promote	fair	work	and	better	quality	
jobs	in	order	to	tackle	in-work	poverty,	social	exclusion,	un-	and	
under-employment,	weak	social	mobility	and	limited	pay	progression.
As	a	result,	a	new	policy	agenda	has	emerged	based	around	socially	
inclusive	economic	growth	and	fair	work,	which	plays	to	FE’s	core	
strengths	(vocational	skills	and	second	chance	education).	Greater	
London,	for	example,	has	developed	policies	and	strategies	that	span	
and	link	up	fair	work,	inclusive	economic	growth,	business	support	
and	skills.	It	has	also	been	argued	(Lupton,	2017)	that,	in	addition	to	
linking	up	skills	with	other	policy	areas,	education	itself	needs	to	adopt	
a	more	integrated	and	sophisticated	approach	that	embraces	human	
development	across	the	life	course,	and	this	has	been	incorporated	
into	the	emerging	policy	model.	These	developments	have	mirrored	
Scottish	policy,	where	the	government	has	maintained	efforts	to	
integrate	skills	policy	and	delivery	with	the	work	of	its	economic	
development	and	business	support	agencies,	and	to	create	a	national	
labour	market	strategy	that	helps	link	skills	to	job	and	pay	progression,	
encourage	better	use	of	skills	by	businesses,	re-train	workers	to	meet	
challenges	posed	by	economic	change	and	new	technologies,	and	
retain	older	workers	in	employment.
Some	FE	colleges	have	been	able	to	help	deliver	important	elements	
of	this	new,	more	integrated	policy	model.	The	concept	of	FE	as	local	
economic	and	enterprise	catalysts	and	hubs	had	been	around	for	
many	years	(Sharp	Commission,	2011),	and	the	new	policy	focus	
on	local	economic	development	and	socially	inclusive	growth	has	
provided	the	perfect	context	to	develop	this	opportunity	to	provide	
local	leadership.
There	are	two	problems.	First,	this	level	of	sophistication	is	not	
mirrored	either	in	national	policy	or	across	all	localities.	Some	CAs	
have	clung	on	to	a	very	traditional	skills	supply	and	demand	matching	
model	reminiscent	of	the	Learning	and	Skills	Council	(LSC)	in	the	mid-
2000s,	and	as	a	result	the	AEB	has	been	commissioned	in	a	haphazard	
fashion,	with	little	or	no	strategic	intent.	Even	the	larger	CAs	have	
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struggled	to	develop	the	capacity	to	cope	with	a	more	ambitious	and	
joined-up	policy	offer	that	spans	skills	supply,	demand	for	skills	and	
some	elements	of	skills	deployment.	This	has	proved	extremely	hard	to	
fund,	create	and	sustain	in	the	absence	of	a	national	policy	lead.
Post-incorporation freedom: what does it mean in a marketplace?
Experience	has	come	to	suggest	that	the	multi-agency	approach	to	
the	regulation	and	oversight	of	FE	(ESFA,	OfS,	FE	Commissioner,	Ofsted	
and	CAs)	is	too	complex	and	is	not	preventing	some	institutions	from	
becoming	insolvent	or	ensuring	the	desired	quality	of	provision.	Rather	
than	blame	systemic	funding	pressures,	government	has	chosen	to	
re-cast	the	regulatory	regime,	and	plans	are	now	afoot	to	create	a	
single,	overarching	regulator	for	FE,	to	mirror	(to	some	extent	at	least)	
the	OfS	for	HE.	These	proposals	bring	with	them	the	implicit	threat	of	
a	powerful	regulator	and	the	ability	of	the	government,	through	the	
direction	of	the	regulator,	to	bring	to	bear	even	greater	and	more	
detailed	control	over	what	colleges	do.	
Many	colleges	therefore	find	themselves	grappling	with	a	set	of	
questions	concerning	what	it	means	to	be	independent	institutions	
facing	a	set	of	competing	and	divergent	demands	(see	various	
contributors	to	Rimmer	et	al,	2018).	Colleges	are	‘free’,	but	free	
from	what,	to	do	what,	and	to	what	end?	This	scenario	plays	out	in	
marketplaces	where	competition	is	high,	funding	tight,	and	different	
stakeholders	at	national	and	local	levels	want	different	behaviours		
and	outcomes.
These	questions	are	given	greater	weight	(in	this	scenario	and	in	
Scenario	1)	by	the	fact	that	national	policy	is	reliant	on	contestability,	
coupled	with	a	traditional	top-down	policy	formation,	which	leaves	
limited	room	for	FE	to	take	the	lead	and	co-create,	let	alone	set,	the	
agenda.	In	a	market,	particularly	one	like	FE	where	the	‘products’	(i.e.	
qualifications)	that	the	provider	sells	have	been	designed	by	other	
parties	(government,	employers	and	awarding	bodies),	the	main	role	
for	colleges	is	to	be	agile	responders	to	policy	priorities	and	market	
forces.	With	the	exception	of	innovation	to	try	to	expand	markets	
(sales	and	outreach)	and	improvements	in	product	and	service	quality,	
college	management’s	main	need	is	to	react	to	customer	signals,	
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preferences	and	choices,	and	whatever	targets	and	priorities	the	
government	has	and	has	embedded	in	Ofsted’s	inspection	system.	
Management	is	meant	to	be	largely	tactical,	with	an	agenda	and	
priorities	set	by	customers	and	government.
Scenario 3:  
The re-discovery and re-invention of a systems approach
Although	current	policy	thinking	tends	to	focus	on	marketisation,	
and	despite	the	fact	that	the	drift	towards	markets,	contestability	
and	choice	has	been	taking	place	under	governments	of	all	political	
persuasions	(New	Labour,	the	Coalition	and	Conservative),	further	
marketisation	is	far	from	being	a	done	deal.	In	a	move	that	has	
attracted	less	attention	than	might	perhaps	have	been	expected,	
the	Labour	Party’s	2017	manifesto	called	for	the	development	of	
a	National	Education	Service	(NES).	The	limited	available	details	
about	NES	suggest	an	explicit	retreat	from	markets	and	competition,	
and	instead	a	renewed	emphasis	on	traditional	models	of	locally-
based	systems	of	provision	and	accountability,	married	with	what	
is	the	possibility	of	a	more	favourable	overall	financial	settlement	
for	education	and	a	new	focus	on	entitlements	to	lifelong	learning	
(Camden,	2018d).	It	is	this	vision	that	the	following	scenario	explores.
Overview
The	government	has	devolved	funding	for	apprenticeship,	adult	FE	and	
new	streams	of	money	to	support	adult	re-training	and	upskilling	in	
support	of	economic	development	to	both	CAs	and	to	other	local	
authorities.	Spending	on	lifelong	learning,	including	the	adult	and	
community	sector,	has	increased	somewhat,	and	linkages	have	been	
forged	between	skills	and	other	areas	of	policy,	such	as	health,	
although	the	NES	finds	itself	in	competition	with	the	government’s	
many	other	urgent	priorities	when	it	comes	to	public	funding.
As	the	aim	has	been	to	restore	some	element	of	‘local	democratic	
accountability’,	LEPs	have	been	bypassed	and	most	of	their	economic	
development	functions	have	been	re-integrated	into	local	authority,	
CA	and	city	region	control,	so	that	they	set,	monitor	and	allocate	
resources.	Debates	are	ongoing	about	whether	and	how	funding	for	
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schools	should	be	devolved,	and	how	localities	can	better	influence	
the	14-19	phase.	There	is	a	stress	on	accountability	to	users,	and	on	
trying	to	integrate	education	and	skills	policies	with	other	areas	of	
public	policy	and	public	service	delivery.
One	of	the	overall	aims,	for	both	central	and	local	government,	is	to	
start	to	join	up:
•	 economic	development
•	 	business	support	and	improvement	services,	workplace,	and	
other	forms	of	innovation
•	 	fair	work,	job	quality	and	skill	use	issues,	and	more	traditional	
skills	supply	policies
In	other	words,	the	kind	of	model	that	Scotland	and	some	of	the	CAs	
were	developing	(Green	et	al,	2017b)	has	become	a	much	broader	
template	for	policy	development	and	action.
New national and local institutional structures
Although	the	rhetoric	is	of	devolution	and	local	control,	both	civil	
servants	and	ministers	cannot	shed	the	now	deep-seated	tradition	of	
wanting	to	maintain	oversight	of	the	levers	of	power.	While	they	
apprehend	that	there	is	a	new	balance	to	be	struck	between	centre	
and	localities,	they	are	as	yet	unsure	where	the	overall	point	of	that	
balance	should	lie.	‘Local	democratic	accountability’	is	a	neat	slogan,	
but	its	design	and	delivery	is	proving	quite	complex	in	a	world	where	a	
range	of	providers	–	including	schools	(of	various	sorts	and	with	widely	
different	governance	structures	and	models	of	accountability),	local	
authority-based	adult	and	community	learning	(ACL)	services,	ITPs,	
varying	forms	of	FE	college,	sixth	form	colleges,	and	third	sector	
providers	–	now	deliver	16-19,	apprenticeship	and	adult	provision.	To	
put	it	another	way,	now	that	the	contestability	genie	is	long	out	of	the	
bottle,	putting	it	back	in	and	reverting	to	a	traditional	systems-based	
approach	is	hard	to	engineer.	Moreover,	as	noted	in	an	earlier	FETL	
report	on	devolution	(Keep,	2016),	some	colleges	and	many	other	
providers	(e.g.	MATs)	are	now	organised	in	chains	that	span	multiple	
localities	and	therefore	local	authorities.	Marketisation	has	produced	a	
very	different	organisational	logic	from	that	which	pertained	under	local	
education	authority	(LEA)	control	in	the	1970s,	and	many	providers	
(including	some	colleges)	have	learned	to	love	their	autonomy.
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Consequently,	the	NES	faces	a	set	of	hard	realities,	one	of	which	
concerns	the	fact	that	in	16-18	and	19	provision	there	are	a	finite	
number	of	students	and	therefore	the	relationship	between	schools	
and	colleges	in	any	given	locality	and	catchment	area	is	essentially	
now	one	of	competition.	ITPs	are	still	keen	to	compete	for	business	
in	a	range	of	FE	market	segments.	In	a	world	where	funding	is	finite,	
cooperation	and	sharing	between	the	different	public	and	private	
providers	has	proved	hard	to	contrive.	As	a	result,	the	government	
is	experimenting	with	the	development	of	a	funding	system	that	
incentivises	cooperation	within	localities,	rewards	collaboration	and	
discourages	high	levels	of	competitive	behaviour.	There	is	a	move	back	
towards	student	number	allocations	for	individual	institutions	linked	
to	local	skills	planning	systems.
Some	colleges	are	fearful	of	‘re-incorporation’	and	of	what	growing	
accountability	to	local	authorities	might	entail.	Having	spent	many	
years	being	encouraged	to	adopt	a	‘wheeler-dealer’	mentality	and	
to	be	highly	responsive	to	opportunities	in	the	market,	some	college	
managements	are	struggling	with	the	notion	that	cooperation	and	
partnership	are	now	the	order	of	the	day.	As	noted	under	Scenario	2,	
there	is	a	longstanding	debate	within	FE	about	the	merits	of	incorporation	
and	what	it	means	in	terms	of	the	types	and	limits	of	the	‘freedoms’	it	
grants	colleges	(see,	for	example,	various	contributors	to	Rimmer	et	al,	
2018;	Hodgson	and	Spours,	2015).	The	reversion	to	a	systems-based	ethos	
for	education	and	training	has	added	impetus	to	these	debates.	A	process	
of	cultural	and	commercial	‘readjustment’	is	ongoing.
As	a	result,	there	are	different	governance	and	accountability	options	
on	the	table	for	FE,	ranging	from	some	form	of	re-incorporation	
(whereby	colleges	return	to	direct	or	arms-length	local	authority	
control),	to	a	spectrum	of	new	models	of	local	collaborative	
arrangements	(tailored	to	circumstances	in	each	locality),	to	the	use	of	
sophisticated	agreed	contracts	and	outcome	agreements	as	a	means	
to	deliver	lighter	touch	accountability.	Given	the	costs,	complications	
and	legislative	requirements	of	re-incorporation,	the	latter	type	of	
model	has	tended	to	win	most	favour,	but	the	threat	of	‘direct	rule’	by	
local	authorities	remains	in	the	background,	not	least	as	a	means	to	
spur	change.
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Creating common interests and goals
This	new	stage	of	devolution	has	also	meant	that	there	is	an	ongoing	
dialogue	and	debate	about	exactly	who	should	be	responsible	
and	take	the	lead	for	which	aspects	of	policy	and	delivery	–	for	
example,	inspection).	Developing	new	institutional	structures	as	
an	interface	between	central	and	local	government	has	not	been	
easy	and	development	work	is	ongoing.	Some	localities	are	happy	
with	what	they	have	been	given,	some	are	struggling	with	their	new	
responsibilities,	and	some	want	far	greater	power	and	funding	than	
they	have	been	allotted.
There	are	models	available	to	structure	a	more	cooperative	set	of	
relationships	between:
•	 providers
•	 providers	and	employers
•	 providers	and	other	stakeholders	in	their	locality
While	these	include	the	ecosystem	and	social	ecosystem	approaches	
(see	Hodgson	et	al,	2017b),	making	them	work	is	not	easy,	as	
Australian	experience	bears	out	(see	Eddington	and	Toner,	2012;	
Buchanan,	Anderson	and	Power,	2017)	and	takes	time,	investment	and	
considerable	developmental	work.	Some	localities	have	made	progress	on	
developing	this	kind	of	approach,	while	others	are	struggling	to	discharge	
their	basic	education-related	responsibilities	in	a	competent	manner.
Integrated institutions
These	developments	have,	perhaps	somewhat	paradoxically,	resulted	
in	some	of	the	market-led	elements	of	integration	described	in	
Scenario	1	emerging	at	local	level	in	this	scenario.	A	locally-based	
system	has,	in	certain	towns	and	cities,	led	to	cooperative	and	
partnership	working	(and	in	a	few	cases	institutional	mergers)	that	
have	shifted	towards	a	tertiary,	all	ages	provider	model.	Where	school	
sixth	forms	are	less	well	entrenched,	a	more	joined-up	model	of	16-19	
provision	has	emerged,	building	on	pre-existing	models	from	some	
parts	of	the	country	–	for	example,	East	Lancashire	and	Exeter	(see	
Ecorys,	2012;	Birkinshaw,	2018).	At	the	same	time,	as	in	Scenario	1,	the	
realisation	that	three-year,	Level	6	full	honours	degrees	are	often	not	
76
what	is	needed	in	many	associate	professional	and	managerial	
occupations,	pressures	on	the	HE	loans	system,	coupled	with	the	
experience	of	the	first	tranche	of	IoTs,	has	led	to	a	revival	in	sub-
degree	provision,	not	least	part-time	provision	for	adults	in	work	(the	
original	model	for	the	now	long-forgotten	foundation	degrees).	
Alliances	of	FE	and	HE	can	often	best	deliver	this	provision	at	a	local	
and	workplace	level.	At	the	same	time,	the	renewed	emphasis	on	adult	
re-skilling,	lifelong	learning	and	the	revival	of	adult	education	has	
underscored	the	logic	of	partnership	working	between	FE,	HE,	existing	
local	authority	adult	services,	and	a	wide	range	of	community	and	
third	sector	groups.
Capacity issues	
Alternative	futures	require	both	the	intellectual	resources	to	imagine,	
envisage	and	advocate	something	different	from	the	status	quo,	as	
well	as	the	capacity	to	develop	and	deliver	new	models	of	policy.	Both	
have	been	found	to	be	lacking	for	a	return	to	a	systems-based	model,	
and	for	policy	to	move	beyond	skills	supply	and	embrace	the	much	
more	complex	set	of	issues	that	link	supply,	demand	and	usage.	This	
capacity	issue	has	impacted	at	both	national	and	local	levels.	Within	
central	government,	civil	servants	have	struggled	to	re-orient	
themselves	away	from	a	reliance	on	marketisation,	which	has	been	
part	of	NPM	orthodoxy	for	the	last	three	decades	and	has	formed	an	
integral	pillar	of	official	assumptions	about	how	best	to	configure	and	
manage	the	delivery	of	skills.
At	local	levels,	local	authorities	have	been	forced	to	recreate	some	
of	the	capacity	and	capabilities	that	used	to	underpin	the	LEAs	of	
old.	Knowledge	and	expertise	have	been	in	short	supply	and	there	
is	nowhere	obvious	to	turn	for	staff	training	and	development	that	
spans	skills,	vocational	training,	the	labour	market	and	links	to	
economic	development.	Moreover,	insofar	as	there	are	individuals	
with	a	memory	of	older	models,	most	come	from	an	LSC	background	
that	brings	with	it	a	very	top-down,	plan	and	match	approach	that	
is	entirely	focused	on	traditional	target-driven,	supply	side	concerns,	
and	brings	little	to	inform	wider	attempts	to	integrate	skills	with	the	
economic	development	and	innovation	agendas.
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This	problem	has	been	compounded	by	the	loss	in	England	of	capable	
intermediary	bodies	of	the	kind	that	still	exist	in	Scotland	that	can	
deal	with	skills	system	management	and	institutional	oversight	(Skills	
Development	Scotland	[SDS]	and	the	Scottish	Funding	Council	[SFC])	
and	economic	development	and	business	improvement	(Scottish	
Enterprise	[SE]	and	Highlands	and	Islands	Enterprise	[HIE]).	The	
removal	of	arms-length	intermediaries	with	some	research	capacity	
and	staff	with	the	expertise	to	establish	useful	relationships	with	the	
institutions	they	oversee,	as	well	as	to	mediate	and	interpret	policy	
(e.g.	UKCES	and	HEFCE)	is	a	major	problem.	England	has	found	itself	
with	bodies	that	are	either	regulators	and/or	narrowly	focused	formula	
funding	bureaucracies.	All	of	the	discretion	and	thinking	capacity	
has	migrated,	intentionally,	to	central	government,	and	therefore	the	
agencies	that	the	government	inherited	had	minimal	infrastructure	
for	engaging	at	anything	other	than	a	superficial	level	with	localities.	
Developing	anew	the	ability	to	deliver	a	more	decentralised,	
distributed	model	that	engages	directly	with	stakeholders,	including	
providers,	and	which	incorporates	feedback	loops	that	allow	the	
frontline	to	tell	policymakers	how	their	policies	are	playing	out	in	
reality,	are	very	hard	to	contrive	given	the	cultural	and	practical	
inheritance	that	the	government	is	confronted	with.
The	same	is	true	in	terms	of	the	collective	representation	and	
organisation	of	employers.	The	Conservative	government’s	decision	
to	abolish	UKCES	and	to	remove	government	support	from	the	SSCs,	
in	order	to	move	to	a	set	of	one-off	clubs	or	groupings	of	enthusiast	
firms	(trailblazer	groups),	means	that	the	infrastructure	needed	to	
engage	with	employers	and	to	organise	them	to	act	collectively	
on	skills	and	economic	development	issues	is	now	lacking	in	many	
sectors.	The	problems	are	also	acute	at	local	levels,	where	CAs	and	
others	are	finding	it	extremely	difficult,	even	in	large	conurbations,	to	
find	effective	mechanisms	through	which	to	work	collectively	with	
employers	on	a	sectoral	or	occupational	basis.
Employers: from customer to partner?
Under	Scenarios	1	and	2,	the	primary	role	of	the	employer	is	to	act	as	
an	informed	and	demanding	customer	in	a	marketplace,	seeking	out	
high	quality	and	keen	value	for	money.	FE,	in	turn,	needs	to	respond	to	
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these	demands	in	order	to	thrive.	The	relationship	is	essentially	a	
one-way	street,	with	employers	receiving	the	outputs	of	the	education	
system,	which	have	often	been	paid	for	by	general	taxation	or	by	
individual	student	debt,	and	against	a	backdrop	where	employers’	
training	investment	is	often	falling	and	where	training	volumes	
(measured	in	hours	or	days	of	training)	continues	to	shrink.	Firms	are	
generally	not	seen	as,	or	expected	to	act	as,	an	integral	component	of	
national	E&T	provision.	Even	in	apprenticeship,	most	employers	are	
relatively	passive	purchasers	of	bought-in	design	and	delivery	of	both	
the	on-and	off-the-job	elements	of	the	process.
On	the	whole,	most	employers	and	those	that	represent	them	have	
been	happy	to	accommodate	this	traditional	model	and	the	passive	
role	that	it	allots	to	them.	They	have	become	used	to	handing	over	
‘shopping	lists’	of	skill	requirements	to	government	and	its	agencies,	
lobbying	to	see	these	met	and	in	return	doing,	and	paying	for,	
relatively	little.	They	have	become	‘welfare	dependent’.
Under	Scenario	3,	this	very	traditional	model	of	how	industry	and	
education	interactions	should	be	envisaged	and	operationalised	
is	undergoing	radical	and,	for	some,	uncomfortable	change.	The	
new	model	aims	to	create	a	genuine	two-way	street,	with	shared	
responsibilities	and	an	increased	expectation	of	what	E&T	employers	
will	fund	long-term.	It	also	seeks	to	provide	for	their	existing	
workforce,	joint	training	and	instructional	capacity	development,	and	
closer	links	between	skills	provision,	work	re-organisation,	job	re-
design	and	upgrades	in	business	strategy	that	boost	the	demand	for	
skills	and	increase	the	likelihood	that	skills	will	be	fully	used	within	
the	workplace	(Keep	and	Mayhew,	2014).	Co-production,	not	least	of	
T	Levels	and	apprenticeships,	is	the	order	of	the	day,	and	supporting	
employers	to	deliver	this	is	a	priority.	The	new	mantra	is	that	‘colleges	
are	working	in	partnership	with,	not	just	for,	employers’.
To	reflect	these	developments,	the	Education	and	Training	Foundation’s	
(ETF)	remit	has	been	broadened	to	cover	employers’	training	and	
human	resource	development.	SMEs	are	being	encouraged,	at	both	
sectoral	and	local	levels,	to	band	together	to	create	shared	training	
and	development	capacity	and	expertise,	and	to	set	up	Group	Training	
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Associations	(GTAs).	At	a	broader	level,	considerable	time,	energy	and	
effort	is	being	sunk	into	concerted	attempts	to	develop	collective	
employer	capacity	to	engage	with	the	E&T	policy	agenda.	This	means	
support	for	industrial	partnerships,	new	sectoral	bodies,	and	new	
and/or	enhanced	local	representative	organisations	for	employers.	
As	both	national	and	local	government	have	finally	realised,	without	
such	intermediary	capacity	(Martin	and	Swank,	2012;	Martin,	2017)	
schools,	colleges,	HEIs,	and	national	and	local	training	agencies	are	
left	trying	to	engage	with	an	atomised	mass	of	employers.	Many	of	
these	are	small	or	micro-businesses,	whose	capacity	to	deliver	usable	
skill	demand	forecasts,	organise	work	placements	or	design,	plan	and	
deliver	high-quality	qualifications,	apprenticeships	or	adult	training	
provision	is	often	nil	(see	Hodgson	et	al,	2017a,	for	a	useful	discussion	
of	this	issue).
Many	employers,	especially	SMEs,	have	reacted	with	fury	at	the	
expectation	that	they	need	to	do	and	pay	for	more.	‘Burdens	on	
business’	and	‘anti-business	government’	have	been	just	two	of	the	
slogans	directed	at	government.	The	NES	is	a	work	in	progress.
Final thoughts and questions
Strategic lessons and policy asks
This	paper	notes	a	number	of	unfulfilled	and/or	incomplete	items	on	
the	policy	agenda,	as	well	as	a	number	of	fundamental	tensions	within	
existing	policy.	In	thinking	about	the	future,	FE	may	collectively	and	
individually	need	to	give	further	thought	to:
•	 	Competition versus cooperation and the incentives 
needed to create and sustain collaboration 
	If	the	goal	of	current	policy	is	to	arrive	at	a	situation	where	
we	possess	a	market	that	also	encompasses	elements	of	
systems-like	behaviour	and	cooperation,	then	what	kind	
of	incentives	structure	would	support	this	development	at	
either	national	or	local	levels?	
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•	 Single regulator versus diffused regulation	
	 	At	present,	regulation	and	accountability	is	complex	and	
convoluted.	Is	there	an	argument	for	trying	to	consolidate	
the	regulation	of	FE	markets	under	a	single	overarching	body	
or	structure	for	cooperation	between	existing	bodies,	or	are	
the	dangers	of	an	overly	directive	regulator	likely	to	outweigh	
any	advantages	from	this	development?	
•	  National market versus local priorities (local versus  
national rewards)	
Particularly	for	those	colleges	that	operate	within	the	
boundaries	of	a	CA,	there	are	questions	about	the	degree	to	
which	devolution	and	new	policy	agendas	at	local	levels	offer	
opportunities	for	colleges	to	broaden	their	mission	and	grow	
their	role	as	anchor	institutions	and	centres	of	economic	
development	and	community	cohesion	and	support?
•	  Higher-level and higher-status provision versus second  
chance and social inclusion	
Are	there	choices	to	be	made	between	trying	to	move		
upwards	into	a	‘tertiary	space’	and	a	stronger	focus	on	higher-
level	provision	and	maintaining	lower	level	provision	(Level	2	
and	below)?	More	broadly,	will	economic	forces	push	colleges	
to	gradually	abandon	some	streams	of	activity	as	they	are	no	
longer	financially	viable?	Where	will	this	leave	the	learners	
who	require	this	provision?	Are	policymakers	sufficiently	aware	
of	the	pressures	that	may	force	such	choices	to	be	made?
General questions:
1.	 	Which	scenario	looks	most	plausible,	and	why?	Which		
looks	most	desirable,	and	why?
2.	 	Are	there	other	scenarios	that	can	be	suggested?		
What	are	they?
3.	 	What	can	FE	colleges	do,	individually	and	collectively,	to	
influence	how	policy	develops?	Who	are	the	audiences	that	
need	to	be	addressed?
4.	 	Who,	either	in	a	market	or	a	system,	is	the	primary	customer?	
Although	DfE	rhetoric	around	informed	student	choice	stresses	
the	student	as	an	individual	customer,	the	reality	is	that	for	
many	of	the	market	segments	that	colleges	are	working	in,	
such	as	19+	loans	funded,	non-levy	apprenticeships	and	un-
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devolved	AEB,	the	college	is	competing	with	other	providers	
for	tranches	of	ESFA	funding	and	student	number	allocations.	
Who,	therefore,	is	the	customer?	ESFA	and	government,	
students	and/or	employers?	How	do	employers	and	especially	
students	make	their	voice	heard?	When	is	the	employer	really	
the	customer?	Is	the	answer	to	this,	when	they	are	paying	for	
it	themselves	–	for	example,	adult	workforce	development	and	
levy-funded	apprenticeship?
5.	 	System	versus	market.	The	DfE	likes	market	rhetoric	but	also	
wants	the	best	bits	of	system	on	occasion	–	for	example,	
the	Social	Mobility	Plan	(2017).	Can	you	have	a	market	with	
elements	of	system-like	architecture	and	behaviour	grafted	on?
6.	 	Is	inter-institution	cooperation	possible	in	a	market,	except	
through	sub-contracting	or	other	formalised	mechanisms?	
Why	would	a	college	cooperate	with	local	schools	when	all	
are	locked	into	a	life	or	death	(see	UTCs,	for	example)	fight	
for	student	numbers	and	survival?
7.	 	What	role	does	and	should	price	play	in	competition?	In	
economic	textbook	models	of	market,	a	large	one,	but	in	
the	reality	of	FE	how	important	is	it?	Is	brand	the	more	
important	factor,	and	if	it	is,	what	does	this	imply	for	
government	plans?
8.	 	In	the	HE	world,	there	is	a	clear	market	regulator:	OfS.	In	FE	
there	is	no	regulator.	What	are,	or	should,	be	the	roles	of:
	 a)	 Ofsted
	 b)	 FE	Commissioner
	 c)	 IfATE
	 d)	 ESFA
	 e)	 	DfE	(particularly	in	regard	to	superintending	the	new	
market	in	FE).	Should	there	be	a	new,	single	super-
regulator?	More	generally,	what	do	we	want	the	role	of	
national	agencies	to	be?	What	capabilities	do	they	need	
to	possess?
9.	 	What	mechanisms	are	available	to	the	student	customer	to	
complain	about	the	quality	or	value	for	money	of	what	they	
are	receiving?
10.	 What	denotes	and	measures	quality	in	this	marketplace?
82
11.	 	How	are	tensions	between	a	system-based	AEB	and	markets	
for	everything	else	(Scenario	2)	likely	to	play	out?
12.	 	Does	a	more	active	role	in	economic	development	and	its	
links	to	skills	make	sense	for	FE	(Scenarios	2	and	3)?	What	
needs	to	change	to	make	this	happen?
13.	 	Vertical	as	opposed	to	horizontal	integration.	Is	the	creation	
of	a	more	joined-up	‘tertiary’	offer	an	important	avenue	to	
explore	(Scenarios	1	and	3)?
14.	 	What	does	local	democratic	accountability	mean?	What	are	the	
implications	of	greater	local	accountability	and	influence	on	the	
operation	of	colleges?	Can	the	national	level	surrender	power	to	
localities?	What	structural	changes	would	be	needed?
15.	 Does	a	skill	ecosystem	approach	make	sense?
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Scenario 1: 
Markets rule
Scenario 2: 
Markets and 
localities
Scenario 3: 
The National 
Education
System (NES)
Overarching 
model
Market Market	and	
system
Predominantly	
system
Accountability Customer	and	
national	state
Customer,	
national	state	
and	locality
Customer,	
stakeholders,	
national	and	
local	state
Funding Constrained Constrained Slightly	less	
constrained
Institutional 
responses
Vertical	
integration	by	
HEIs
Institutional	
failure	and	
intense	
competition
Issues and 
tensions
Localism	
constrained;	
market	versus	
targets	versus	
government	
aspirations;	
scams	and	
‘fiddles’;	
regulatory	issues;
local	monopolies
Individual	
versus	employer	
as	customer;	
national	versus	
local;	wide	
variations	
between	
localities;	market	
versus	system;	
problems	caused	
by	closures
National	versus	
local	versus	
stakeholders’	
interests;	
democratic	
accountability;	
common	goals	
in	a	fragmented	
environment;	
management	
and	policy	
capacity;	
employers	
unhappy	at	
demands	for	a	
more	active	role
Scenario table
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